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INTRODUCTION
Increasingly, we find ourselves addressing twenty-first century chal-
lenges with twentieth-century laws.1
As Louise Doswald-Beck correctly stated in her 1998 article, “[a]ny
attempt to look into the future is fraught with difficulty and the likelihood
* Associate Professor, Brigham Young University Law School. The author spent
twenty years in the U.S. military, including five as a Cavalry officer and the rest as a JAG
officer, including deployments to Bosnia, Macedonia, Kosovo, and Iraq. His last job in the
U.S. Army was as the Chief of International Law. He would like to thank the faculty of
Brigham Young University Law School for their assistance as well as attendees at the Rocky
Mountain Junior Scholars Forum. Additionally, Allison Arnold, Matthew Hadfield, Rebecca
Hansen, SueAnn Johnson, Rachel LeCheminant, Brigham Udall, and Aaron Worthen
provided excellent research and review assistance.
1. Harold Hongju Koh, The State Department Legal Adviser’s Office: Eight Decades
in Peace and War, 100 GEO. L.J. 1747, 1772 (2012); see also Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d
866, 882 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Brown, J., concurring) (“War is a challenge to law, and the law
must adjust. It must recognize that the old wineskins of international law, domestic criminal
procedure, or other prior frameworks are ill-suited to the bitter wine of this new warfare. We
can no longer afford diffidence. This war has placed us not just at, but already past the lead-
ing edge of a new and frightening paradigm, one that demands new rules be written. Falling
back on the comfort of prior practices supplies only illusory comfort.”).
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that much of it will be wrong.”2 This, in part, accounts for the military
axiom that a nation is always preparing to fight the last war. In a study
about future war, military historian and theorist Thomas Mackubin writes
that research has shown “the United States has suffered a major strategic
surprise on the average of once a decade since 1940.”3
If this inherent lag is true about the tactics and strategy of fighting
wars, it is even more true concerning the law governing the fighting of
wars. Michael Reisman writes that, “[b]ecause modern specialists in vio-
lence constantly seek new and unexpected ways of defeating adversaries,
the codified body of the law of armed conflict always lags at least a genera-
tion behind.”4 This law lag was recently illustrated by those who have ar-
gued for new laws to govern the post–9/11 armed conflict paradigm.5
The historical fact that the law of armed conflict (LOAC) has always
lagged behind current methods of warfare does not mean that it always
must. This Article will argue that the underlying assumption that law must
be reactive is not an intrinsic reality inherent in effective armed conflict
governance. Rather, just as military practitioners work steadily to predict
new threats and defend against them, LOAC practitioners need to focus
on the future of armed conflict and attempt to be proactive in evolving the
law to meet future needs.
In a recent article in The Atlantic, authors Andrew Hessel, Marc
Goodman, and Steven Kotler propose a hypothetical in the year 2016
where an anonymous web personality known as Cap’n Capsid posts a
competition to deliver a specific virus that, unbeknownst to the competi-
tors, is linked to the DNA of the President of the United States. The virus
eventually makes its way to Samantha, a sophomore majoring in govern-
2. Louise Doswald-Beck, Implementation of International Humanitarian Law in Fu-
ture Wars, in 71 INT’L L. STUD., THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTO THE NEXT MILLEN-
NIUM 39, 39 (1998); Stephen Peter Rosen, The Future of War and the American Military,
HARV. MAG., May-June 2002, at 29, 29 (“The people who run the American military have to
be futurists, whether they want to be or not. The process of developing and building new
weapons takes decades, as does the process of recruiting and training new military officers.
As a result, when taking such steps, leaders are making statements, implicitly or explicitly,
about what they think will be useful many years in the future.”). Despite the difficulty, it is a
vital requirement of militaries and one in which plenty of people are still willing to engage.
See Frank Jacobs & Parag Khanna, The New World, N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 22, 2012), www.ny-
times.com/interactive/2012/09/23/opinion/sunday/the-new-world.html.
3. Mackubin Thomas Owens, Reflections on Future War, NAVAL WAR C. REV., Sum-
mer 2008, at 61, 64.
4. W. Michael Reisman, Rasul v. Bush: A Failure to Apply International Law, 2 J.
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 973, 973 (2004).
5. See NEW WARS, NEW LAWS? APPLYING THE LAWS OF WAR IN 21ST CENTURY
CONFLICTS (David Wippman & Matthew Evangelista eds., 2005); Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks,
War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and the Law of Armed Conflict in the Age of
Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675 (2004); Geoffrey S. Corn, Hamdan, Lebanon, and the Regula-
tion of Hostilities: The Need to Recognize a Hybrid Category of Armed Conflict, 40 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 295 (2007); Roy S. Schondorf, Extra-State Armed Conflicts: Is There a Need
for a New Legal Regime?, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1 (2004); Robert D. Sloane, Prologue
to a Voluntarist War Convention, 106 MICH. L. REV. 443 (2007).
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ment at Harvard University, who ingests it and comes down with the flu.
Given her symptoms, she quickly spreads billions of virus particles, in-
fecting many of her college friends who also get flu-like symptoms, but
nothing very harmful.
This would change when the virus crossed paths with cells contain-
ing a very specific DNA sequence, a sequence that would act as a
molecular key to unlock secondary functions that were not so be-
nign. This secondary sequence would trigger a fast-acting neuro-
destructive disease that produced memory loss and, eventually,
death. The only person in the world with this DNA sequence was
the president of the United States, who was scheduled to speak at
Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government later that week. Sure,
thousands of people on campus would be sniffling, but the Secret
Service probably wouldn’t think anything was amiss. It was De-
cember, after all—cold-and-flu season.6
This scenario may sound more like science fiction than like something
you would read in a law review article. However, events like this seem
inevitable as the technology of war progresses. Such events raise numer-
ous legal issues both about the law of going to war, or jus ad bellum, and
the LOAC, or jus in bello. Would this be considered a “use of force” in
violation of the U.N. Charter?7 In relation to jus ad bellum, would it be
considered an “armed attack,” giving the United States the right to exer-
cise self-defense?8 How would these answers be affected if Cap’n Capsid
were not a state actor, but a terrorist or an individual acting on his own?
With respect to the jus in bello, was this an attack, triggering the LOAC? If
so, did it violate the principles of distinction or discrimination?9 Is a genet-
ically coded virus a lawful weapon?
6. Andrew Hessel, Marc Goodman & Steven Kotler, Hacking the President’s DNA,
THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 24, 2012, 10:42 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/
2012/11/hacking-the-presidents-dna/309147/.
7. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. Article 2, paragraph 4 has become the accepted para-
digm restricting the use of force among states. Actions that amount to a threat or use of force
are considered a violation of international law. However, the international community has
very different views on what the language actually means and the Charter contains no
definitions.
8. U.N. Charter art. 51. The definition of armed attack is controversial. There is no
agreed definition of what equates to an armed attack. Despite this lack of clarity, states seem
to agree that not all armed military actions equate to an armed attack. The ICJ confirmed
this in the Nicaragua case when it decided that Nicaragua’s provision of arms to the opposi-
tion in El Salvador was not an armed attack. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 195 (June 27). Additionally, there are
unresolved questions about the application of new technologies, such as cyber operations, to
armed attack. It is still unclear what level of offensive cyber operations against a state will
constitute an armed attack.
9. See infra, section II.C.2.b. The principle of distinction requires militaries to distin-
guish between civilians and combatants in the attack. Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 48, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I].
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Technological development in each of the areas highlighted in the sce-
nario mentioned above is proceeding quickly, and not just in the United
States but also amongst nations throughout the world. While much of the
development is currently for peaceful purposes, there is no doubt that
many, if not all, of these advances will be weaponized over time. Histori-
cally, few technologies throughout history that can be weaponized have
not been.10
P.W. Singer, known scholar on advancing technologies and the law,
has recently written,
Are we going to let the fact that these [new technologies] look like
science fiction, sound like science fiction, feel like science fiction,
keep us in denial that these are battlefield reality? Are we going
to be like a previous generation that looked at another science
fiction-like technology, the atomic bomb? The name “atomic
bomb” and the concept come from an H.G. Wells short story. In-
deed, the very concept of the nuclear chain reaction also came
from that same sci-fi short story. Are we going to be like that past
generation that looked at this stuff and said, “We don’t have to
wrestle with all the moral, social, and ethical issues that come out
of it until after Pandora’s box is open?”11
Pandora’s box is opening as new technologies are being developed. They
will inevitably shape the future battlefield, affecting where conflicts are
fought, by whom they are fought, and the means and methods used to
fight.
The premise of this Article is that we are at a point in history where
we can see into the future of armed conflict and discern some obvious
points where future technologies and developments are going to stress the
current LOAC. While the current LOAC will be sufficient to regulate the
majority of future conflicts, we must respond to these discernible issues by
anticipating how to evolve the LOAC in an effort to bring these future
weapons under control of the law, rather than have them used with devas-
tating effect before the lagging law can react.
Part I of this article will argue that the LOAC plays a vital signaling
role in warfare that is especially needed at this time of technological inno-
vation. Like these changing technologies, the LOAC must also evolve to
face the new challenges of future armed conflict. Part II will project armed
conflict into the future in three main categories—places, actors, and means
and methods—and analyze how advancing technologies and techniques
The principle of discrimination requires each specific attack, including each weapon system,
to be able to differentiate in the attack and only attack intended targets. Id., art. 57.
10. John D. Banusiewicz, Lynn Outlines New Cybersecurity Effort, U.S. DEP’T OF ST.
(June 16, 2011), http://www.defense.gov/utility/printitem.aspx?print=http://www.defense.gov/
news/newsarticle.aspx?id=64349.
11. P.W. Singer, Ethical Implications of Military Robotics, The 2009 William C. Stutt
Ethics Lecture, United States Naval Academy (Mar. 25, 2009), available at http://www
.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/navy/usna_singer_robot_ethics.pdf.
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will call into question the current LOAC’s ability to adequately regulate
armed conflict. This Part will identify specific principles of the LOAC, the
effectiveness of which will wane in the face of state practice, and suggest
emerging concepts that will allow the LOAC to evolve and maintain its
relevance and virulence in armed conflict. The Article will then conclude.
I. OSTRICHES OR BUTTERFLIES
Warfare has always been an evolving concept. Throughout history, it
has constantly been shaped and altered by the exigencies of nations and
the moral sentiments of the global community. Yet, the paramount force
behind this continual military evolution is not economic, social, or moral;
rather, the greatest controlling factor has been the ever-changing limita-
tions of wartime technology. . . . For centuries, nations have searched for
and sought ways to utilize technological advancements to overcome mate-
rial deficiencies.12
We have all heard or read about how, when faced with danger or ad-
versity, the ostrich buries its head in the sand, hoping the bad thing will
pass and leave it unharmed. While this is a myth,13 it is also a powerful
metaphor to describe a possible reaction to a threat. Compare that mythi-
cal reaction of the ostrich with the theory of the “coevolutionary arms
race”14 in plants and animals, where a change in the genetic composition
of one species is in response to a genetic change in another.15 For example,
over time, the Heliconius butterfly has co-evolved with the passion vine
through a series of changes and counter-changes that now link the two
inextricably together. As the passion vine developed toxins to protect it-
self from overfeeding, the Heliconius developed the ability to internalize
the toxin and then use it as a defense against its own predators. Similarly,
while the Heliconius feeds on the passion vine, it also fertilizes the vine,
ensuring the vine’s survival.16
The natural phenomenon of the co-evolutionary arms race between
species is instructive in considering the LOAC and its relationship with
12. Bradley Raboin, Corresponding Evolution: International Law and the Emergence
of Cyber Warfare, 31 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 602, 603 (2011).
13. Karl S. Kruszelnicki, Ostrich Head in Sand, ABC SCIENCE (Nov. 2, 2006), http://
www.abc.net.au/science/articles/2006/11/02/1777947.htm.
14. Richard Dawkins & John R. Krebs, Arms Races Between and Within Species, 205
PROC. ROYAL SOC’Y LONDON, SERIES B, BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES 489 (1979); Interview with
Charles Riley Nelson, Professor, Department of Biology, Brigham Young University, in
Provo, Utah (Dec. 20, 2012).
15. Paul R. Ehrlich & Peter H. Raven, Butterflies and Plants: A Study in Coevolution,
18 EVOLUTION 586 (1964); Daniel H. Janzen, When is it Coevolution?, 34 EVOLUTION 611
(1980); John N. Thompson, Concepts of Coevolution, 4 TRENDS ECOLOGY & EVOLUTION 179
(1989).
16. Interview with Charles Riley Nelson, Professor, Department of Biology, Brigham
Young University, in Provo, Utah (Dec. 20, 2012) (explaining coevolutionary analysis using
the example of the Heliconius and passion vine); see also Lawrence E. Gilbert, The Coevolu-
tion of a Butterfly and a Vine, 247 SCI. AM., Aug. 1982, at 110 (describing how species of
Heliconius and passion vine have influenced each other’s evolution).
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advancing technology. In response to advancing technologies that will un-
doubtedly affect the conduct of hostilities on the future battlefield, the
LOAC can play the role of the ostrich and stick its head in the sand by
saying that the current rules are sufficient and all technologies must mold
themselves to current rules or not be used. Alternatively, the LOAC can
play the role of the butterfly and respond to future developments (or even
anticipate them) and adapt or evolve sufficiently to regulate these devel-
opments in a meaningful way.
A. Evolution
Predicting the future is very difficult,17 and fraught with the potential
for serious error. Hence, the law of armed conflict has been mostly reac-
tive throughout its history. The Fourth Geneva Convention of 194918 con-
cerning the protection of civilians during armed conflicts did not come
about until after the devastating attacks on civilians that occurred in
World War II.19 Likewise, the Additional Protocols of 197720 did not ex-
tend protections to victims of non-international armed conflict until de-
cades of lobbying by the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC).21
The ICRC is engaged in a similar work now. During the recent sixty-
year commemoration of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the ICRC re-
ported on a number of concerns looking at current and future armed con-
flicts where the law may need to evolve in order to address the needs of
victims of armed conflict.22 Most of these suggestions are based on reac-
tions to current conflicts, but they clearly denote that the international
community cannot take the “ostrich’s” approach to impending problems.
If the law is going to maintain its relevance and ability to adequately regu-
17. Katie Drummond, Defense Whiz to Pentagon: Your Predictions are Destined to
Fail, WIRED (Oct. 28, 2011, 2:54 PM), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/10/danzig-mil-
itary-predictions/ (“The U.S. government has a perfectly awful track record of predicting
future events. And there’s a good reason why, says the chairman of an influential think tank:
it’s friggin’ impossible.”).
18. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention].
19. See Civilians protected under international humanitarian law, INT’L COMM. RED
CROSS (Oct. 29, 2010), http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/protected-persons/civilians/over-
view-civilians-protected.htm.
20. Protocol I, supra note 9, art. 43, para. 2; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Con-
ventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-international
Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Protocol II].
21. Eric Talbot Jensen, Applying a Sovereign Agency Theory of the Law of Armed
Conflict, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 685, 693–94 (2012).
22. Jakob Kellenberger, President, Int’l Comm. Red Cross, Sixty Years of the Geneva
Conventions: Learning from the Past to Better Face the Future, Address at Ceremony to
celebrate the 60th anniversary of the Geneva Conventions, (Aug. 12, 2009), available at http:/
/www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/statement/geneva-conventions-statement-president-
120809.htm.
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late armed conflict, it must take the “butterfly’s” approach and be adap-
tive and able to evolve in the face of difficulties.23
Employing the ostrich’s approach and failing to infuse flexibility and
adaptability into the LOAC will lead to an increase in the recent phenom-
enon known as lawfare, or “the use of law as a weapon of war.”24 Recent
examples of this phenomenon abound25 and many LOAC scholars argue
that the current LOAC regime in fact encourages non-compliance and in-
centivizes fighters to use the LOAC as a shield to give them an advantage
when fighting LOAC-compliant forces.26
23. See Kenneth Anderson & Matthew Waxman, Law and Ethics for Robot Soldiers,
POL’Y REV. (Dec. 1, 2012), http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/135336
(making a similar argument very effectively with respect to autonomous weapon systems);
Louise Arbour, 10 Conflicts to Watch in 2013, FOREIGN POLICY (Dec. 27, 2012), http://www
.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/12/27/10_conflicts_to_watch_in_2013 (pointing to the princi-
ples of distinction between civilians and combatants and collateral damage from advanced
technology as two pressures on the LOAC). But see Brad Allenby & Carolyn Mattick, Why
We Need New Rules of War, SLATE (Nov. 12, 2012), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/
future_tense/2012/11/
drones_cyberconflict_and_other_military_technologies_require_we_rewrite.html.
24. See Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Law and Military Interventions: Preserving Humanita-
rian Values in 21st Century Conflicts, HARVARD PROGRAM ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND
HUMAN RIGHTS, WORKSHOP PAPERS: “HUMANITARIAN CHALLENGES IN MILITARY INTER-
VENTION” 4, 5 (2001), available at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/cchrp/Web%20Working%20
Papers/Use%20of%20Force/Dunlap2001.pdf; MICHAEL N. SCHMITT, THE IMPACT OF HIGH
AND LOW-TECH WARFARE ON THE PRINCIPLE OF DISTINCTION, HARVARD PROGRAM ON
HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH, INT’L HUMANITARIAN LAW RESEARCH
INITIATIVE BRIEFING PAPER, 1, 7 (November 2003), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL HUMANI-
TARIAN LAW AND THE 21ST CENTURY’S CONFLICTS: CHANGES AND CHALLENGES (Roberta
Arnold & Pierre-Antoine Hildbrand eds., 2005).
25. The recent war in Iraq illustrates many examples. Tony Perry & Rick Loomis,
Mosque Targeted in Fallouja Fighting, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2004), http://articles.latimes.com/
print/2004/apr/27/world/fg-fallouja27 (attacking from protected places and using them as
weapons storage sites); Coalition Forces Continue Advance Toward Baghdad, CNN (Mar. 24,
2003), http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0303/24/se.17.html (fighting without wear-
ing a proper uniform); The Rules of War are Foreign to Saddam, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Mar. 25,
2003, available at LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS File (using human shields to protect
military targets); David Blair, Human Shields Disillusioned with Saddam, Leave Iraq after
Dubious Postings, NATIONAL POST (Canada), Mar. 4, 2003, at A1, available at LEXIS, Nexis
Library, CURNWS File (same); David B. Rivkin, Jr. & Lee A. Casey, Leashing the Dogs of
War, NAT’L INT. (Sept. 1, 2003), http://nationalinterest.org/article/leashing-the-dogs-of-war-
1120) (using protected symbols to gain military advantage); South Korean Hostage Beheaded
in Iraq, TORONTO STAR, June 23, 2004, available at LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS File
(murdering prisoners or others who deserve protection); see also Michael Sirak, Legal Armed
Conflict, JANE’S DEF. WKLY, Jan. 14, 2004, at 27 (listing a number of violations of the law of
war committed by Iraqi military and paramilitary forces). In each of these cases, an inferior
force used the superior force’s commitment to adhere to the law of war to their tactical
advantage.
26. See, e.g., Dunlap, supra note 24, at 6 (“[T]here is disturbing evidence that the rule
of law is being hijacked into just another way of fighting (lawfare), to the detriment of hu-
manitarian values as well as the law itself.”); Owens, supra note 3, at 70 (“Thus these enemies
will try to leverage ‘lawfare,’ the use of the rules of warfare against the United States (while
ignoring these rules themselves), by, for example, taking refuge among the civilian popula-
tion in an attempt to maximize civilian casualties. In turn, adversaries employing complex
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Much of the recent lawfare discussion has centered on backward mili-
tary opponents or non-state actors who need to use lawfare to overcome
asymmetric disadvantages.27 However, a static and inflexible LOAC will
incentivize even developed and powerful nations to use the law as a tool,
rather than as a regulator. The Chinese already write of “three warfares”
including “legal warfare,” which is defined as “arguing that one’s own side
is obeying the law, criticizing the other side for violating the law, and mak-
ing arguments for one’s own side in cases where there are also violations
of the law.”28 This Chinese view portrays the law generally “as a means of
enforcing societal (and state) control of the population.”29 Presumably,
this would apply to both domestic and international law.
China is, of course, not alone in potentially using lawfare to gain an
edge through future technologies. The United States has come under
heavy criticism recently for its use of drones in fighting transnational ter-
rorism.30 Though U.S. and Chinese perspectives on the law may be differ-
ent,31 the danger of a static and inflexible approach to the LOAC as future
technologies emerge is equally applicable to developed and undeveloped,
irregular warfare will take advantage of the fact that such casualties are magnified by the
proliferation of media assets on the battlefield.”); Jason Vest, Fourth-Generation Warfare,
THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 1, 2001), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2001/12/fourth-
generation-warfare/302368/ (discussing Fourth-generation Warfare which includes a recogni-
tion of asymmetric operations “in which a vast mismatch exists between the resources and
philosophies of the combatants, and in which the emphasis is on bypassing an opposing mili-
tary force and striking directly at cultural, political, or population targets”).
27. The Council on Foreign Relations has defined lawfare as “a strategy of using or
misusing law as a substitute for traditional military means to achieve military objectives.” See
Jefferson D. Reynolds, Collateral Damage on the 21st Century Battlefield: Enemy Exploita-
tion of the Law of Armed Conflict, and the Struggle for a Moral High Ground, 56 A.F.L. REV.
1, 78 (2005); Lawfare, the Latest in Assymetries, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Mar. 18, 2003),
http://www.cfr.org/publication.html?id=5772.
28. Dean Cheng, Winning Without Fighting: Chinese Legal Warfare, HERITAGE
FOUND. (May 21, 2012) http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/05/winning-without-
fighting-chinese-legal-warfare.
29. Id. The report also states “[n]o strong tradition that held the law as a means of
constraining authority itself ever developed in China.” Id. at 3.
30. Chris Jenks, Law from Above: Unmanned Aerial Systems, Use of Force, and the
Law of Armed Conflict, 85 N.D. L. REV. 649, 651 (2010); Thomas Michael McDonnell, Sow
What You Reap? Using Predator and Reaper Drones to Carry Out Assassinations or Targeted
Killings of Suspected Islamic Terrorists, 44 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 243, 246–47 (2012);
Owen Bowcott, UN to Examine UK and US Drone Strikes, GUARDIAN (Jan. 23, 2013), http://
www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jan/24/un-examine-uk-afghanistan-drone-strikes; Owen
Bowcott, UN to Investigate Civilian Deaths from U.S. Drone Strikes, GUARDIAN (Oct. 25,
2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/oct/25/un-inquiry-us-drone-strikes; see Robert
P. Barnidge, Jr., A Qualified Defense of American Drone Attacks in Northwest Pakistan
Under International Humanitarian Law, 30 B.U. INT’L L.J. 409 (2012).
31. See Cheng, supra note 28, at 6 (“The most important strategic difference between
[the United States and China] is that there is little evidence that Chinese analysts and deci-
sion-makers see legal warfare as a misuse of the law. Given the much more instrumentalist
view of the law in Chinese history, the idea that the law would be employed toward a given
end (in support of higher military and national goals) would be consistent with Chinese cul-
ture but problematic, if not antithetical, from the Western perspective.”).
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Western and non-Western nations. The international community needs to
take the butterfly’s approach and not that of the ostrich. It is only through
being proactive and recognizing the pressures that future developments
will have on the LOAC (such as where conflicts are fought, by whom they
are fought, and the means and methods used to fight) that the LOAC can
evolve to avoid increasing lawfare and maintain its role as regulator on the
conduct of armed conflict.
B. Signaling
The analogy of the ostrich and the butterfly is useful to illustrate the
fate of non-evolving principles in the face of a changing technological en-
vironment. Indeed, the fate of organisms is often based on their ability to
understand environmental signals that are occurring around them. In this
way, the analogy would seem to argue that taking a reactive approach to
changing circumstances would be sufficient, especially if the reaction
comes quickly. In other words, the law need not be proactive, as this Arti-
cle argues, but can remain reactive, particularly if the international com-
munity decreases the reaction time and makes changes quickly in response
to technological developments.
This argument might appear to be especially true in the case of inter-
national law generally, and the LOAC specifically, since they are so heav-
ily dependent on state practice and preferences. These areas of the law
develop based mainly on consensual agreements between states and also
on the activities of states, particularly when done through a sense of legal
obligation. These twin sources of international law are complemented by
other general principles of law recognized by civilized nations such as eq-
uity, judicial decisions, and the teachings of the most highly qualified pub-
licists.32 As technologies develop, states will have time to consider their
potential application to armed conflict and then deliberate on the best way
to apply the law to changing circumstances. If nothing else, this approach
will certainly maintain the maximum freedom to maneuver for states that
are developing new technologies.
This approach would continue millennia of LOAC formulation where
custom ripened over time. Increasing the speed with which actions ripen
32. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute], which states:
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law
such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of
the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary
means for the determination of rules of law.
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into customary international law would also be beneficial. However, rely-
ing solely on quick reaction to technological developments ignores the vi-
tal signaling role that the LOAC plays in the development of state
practice.
The signaling value of the LOAC is clear from the Protocol Additional
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protec-
tion of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (GPI). Article 36 of GPI,
titled “New weapons,” states:
In the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new
weapon, means or method of warfare, a High Contracting Party is
under an obligation to determine whether its employment would,
in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by this Protocol or by
any other rule of international law applicable to the High Con-
tracting Party.33
This article requires every state that is contemplating developing a new
technology or weaponizing an existing technology to ensure that such de-
velopment complies with the LOAC. In other words, the LOAC signals to
states what is permissible and what is not even at the stage of study and
development of new weapons.34
U.S. practice in this area is very clear. Even prior to GPI coming into
effect, the United States required such a review,35 and it is now codified in
Department of Defense Directive 5000.01, which states:
The acquisition and procurement of DoD weapons and weapon
systems shall be consistent with all applicable domestic law and
treaties and international agreements (for arms control agree-
ments, see DoD Directive 2060.1 (Reference (lm), customary in-
ternational law, and the law of armed conflict (also known as the
laws and customs of war). An attorney authorized to conduct such
legal reviews in the Department shall conduct the legal review of
the intended acquisition of weapons or weapons systems.36
Each military service has an attorney designated to do such reviews.37
33. Protocol I, supra note 9, art. 36; cf. Duncan Blake & Joseph S. Imburgia, “Blood-
less Weapons”? The Need to Conduct Legal Reviews of Certain Capabilities and the Implica-
tions of Defining Them as “Weapons”, 66 A.F. L. REV. 157, 159, 161 (2010) (discussing the
application of legal reviews to certain future and developing weapons).
34. Neil Davison, How International Law Adapts to New Weapons and Technologies
of Warfare, INTERCROSS BLOG (Dec. 4, 2012), http://intercrossblog.icrc.org/blog/how-interna-
tional-law-adapts-new-weapons-and-technologies-warfare.
35. GEOFFREY S. CORN, ET AL., THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: AN OPERATIONAL
APPROACH 203 (2012).
36. Dept. of Def. Directive 5000.01, The Defense Acquisition System ¶ E1.1.15
(D.O.D. 2003) (Certified Current as of Nov. 20, 2007), available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/
directives/corres/pdf/500001p.pdf.
37. For an example of a weapon review, see CORN, ET AL., supra note 35, at 228–31
(2012).
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This requirement would clearly apply to all new and developing tech-
nologies that states may be considering. In such cases, the proposed
weapon or means or method of warfare would be reviewed by a legal ad-
viser who would determine its legality under the current law. In many
cases, this review might be quite easy. However, it is here that Harold
Koh’s quote from the beginning of this Article38 is most relevant. The le-
gal adviser performing the review will look to the current LOAC for sig-
nals as to the legality of a proposed weapon, but that may prove difficult if
the existing law does not adequately apply to the future weapon. In the
absence of apparently applicable law, each legal adviser or nation is left to
a discretionary decision that may lead to uneven application of LOAC
constraints.
In addition to the legal review at the research and development stage,
the law also requires a legal review at the point the weapon is employed.
Article 82 of the same Protocol, titled “Legal Advisers in Armed Forces,”
states:
The High Contracting Parties at all times, and the Parties to the
conflict in time of armed conflict, shall ensure that legal advisers
are available, when necessary, to advise military commanders at
the appropriate level on the application of the Conventions and
this Protocol and on the appropriate instruction to be given to the
armed forces on this subject.39
It is clear from this provision that an otherwise lawful weapon can be
employed in an unlawful way. Additionally, advanced technologies might
provide tactical options that otherwise do not exist. In each case, the legal
adviser must be available to the commander to provide legal advice, but
the legal adviser will be looking to the LOAC for signals as to how to
apply the LOAC in that specific situation. If the law is not specific to that
potential employment or tactic, the legal adviser must be able to extrapo-
late existing rules to new technologies.
The recent development and deployment of cyber weapons demon-
strates that applying existing rules to new technologies will present diffi-
culties. Over the past decade, numerous statements and articles have been
written on the application of the law to cyber operations, often coming out
with different conclusions. Some have argued that existing law is suffi-
ciently flexible to respond to new technologies such as cyber capabilities,40
38. Koh, supra note 1 (“Increasingly, we find ourselves addressing twenty-first century
challenges with twentieth-century laws.”).
39. Protocol I, supra note 9, art. 86 (emphasis added).
40. Michael N. Schmitt, IHL Challenges Series—Part III on New Technologies, INTER-
CROSS (June 17, 2013), http://intercrossblog.icrc.org/blog/ihl-challenges-series-part-iii-new-
technologies; cf. Cordula Droege, Get Off My Cloud: Cyber Warfare, International Humani-
tarian Law, and the Protection of Civilians, 94 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 533 (2012).
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while others argue that a whole new set of rules should be written to pro-
vide proper guidance.41
In response to this ongoing debate, a group of international LOAC
experts embarked on a three-year process to determine how the LOAC
applied to cyber operations.42 Headed by Michael N. Schmitt, a renowned
cyber scholar,43 the experts found that they had to interpret or evolve the
law in certain areas for it to sufficiently provide guidance to cyber opera-
tors. For example, most of the experts determined that the traditional defi-
nition of “attack” was insufficient to determine when the LOAC applied
to cyber activities. Instead, a cyber action that affected the functionality of
a cyber system might also be considered an attack.44
This example is representative of similar difficulties that will occur as
new technologies are developed and used. For example, in the scenario
quoted from The Atlantic at the beginning of this article, would the em-
ploying of the virus in the proposed way violate the principle of distinc-
tion, even though it was absolutely discriminating in the attack? Similar
issues will be raised below.
There is no doubt that legal advisers have been extrapolating rules to
new technologies throughout history. But as will be shown below, the
kinds of technological advances in weapons and tactics will be unprece-
dented over the next few decades, applying tremendous stresses on the
LOAC. Because of the important signaling role the LOAC plays in provid-
ing guidance to states and their legal advisers, particularly during research
and development, the international community needs to begin now to ana-
lyze these future weapons and tactics and proactively provide guidance on
the application of the LOAC to future armed conflict.
II. THE FUTURE OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
The nature of armed conflict, and of the causes and consequences of
such conflict, is continuing to evolve. IHL must evolve too.45
Jakob Kellenberger’s statement above, as the president of the ICRC,
reflects the fundamental need to evolve IHL to the changing nature of
armed conflict. The ICRC’s approach is not in disagreement with that of
41. Alireza Miryousefi & Hossein Gharibi, View from Iran: World Needs Rules on
Cyberattacks, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.csmonitor.com/
Commentary/Opinion/2013/0214/View-from-Iran-World-needs-rules-on-cyberattacks-video;
Jody R. Westby, We Need New Rules for Cyber Warfare, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2013), http://
www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/02/28/what-is-an-act-of-cyberwar/we-need-new-rules-
of-engagment-for-cyberwar.
42. THE TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER
WARFARE 1 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL]. Note that the
author was one of the participants in the formulation of the Manual.
43. Michael N. Schmitt: Faculty Profile, U.S. NAVAL WAR C., https://www.usnwc.edu/
Academics/Faculty/Michael-Schmitt.aspx (last visited Mar. 9, 2014).
44. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 42, at 156–159.
45. Kellenberger, supra note 22.
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the International Court of Justice (ICJ), as stated in the 1996 Nuclear
Weapons Advisory Opinion:
However, it cannot be concluded from this that the established
principles and rules of humanitarian law applicable in armed con-
flict did not apply to nuclear weapons. Such a conclusion would be
incompatible with the intrinsically humanitarian character of the
legal principles in question which permeates the entire law of
armed conflict and applies to all forms of warfare and to all kinds
of weapons, those of the past, those of the present, and those of
the future.46
The assumption that the “intrinsically humanitarian character of the legal
principles” of the LOAC applies to future forms of warfare does not mean
that the principles cannot evolve. Rather, the decision by the ICJ that the
new technology of nuclear weapons continued to be regulated by the
LOAC demonstrates that the ICJ views the law as adaptive to new weapon
systems even on LOAC’s core fundamental principles.
Many commentators have discussed the need for change in various
aspects of the laws applicable to the initiation and continuation of armed
conflict,47 including the division of international law into jus ad bellum and
46. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 259, ¶ 86 (July 8).
47. See Brooks, supra note 5, at 684 (“In the long run, the old categories and rules
need to be replaced by a radically different system that better reflects the changed nature of
twenty-first century conflict and threat.”); Interview with Peter W. Singer, Senior Fellow, the
Brookings Institute, available at http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2012/s3442876.htm (“I
think the way to think about this is that when we look at the laws of war that are set for—that
are supposed to guide us today, they date from a year when the most important invention
was the 45 RPM vinyl record player. We don’t listen to music on vinyl record players any-
more. I’m guessing a lot of the audience might never have listened to music on a vinyl record
player anymore. And yet, the laws of war from that year, we still try and apply today. And so
it doesn’t mean that the laws of war, you know, you need to throw them out, but it does mean
that they’re having a real hard time.”); see also Sylvain Charat, Three Weapons to Fight Ter-
ror, WASH. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2004), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2004/sep/8/
20040908-085545-9034r/. Judge George H. Aldrich identified “those aspects of the law that
are most in need of further development in the early years of the next century” for interna-
tional armed conflicts as:
(1) entitlement of those who take up arms to combatant and prisoner-of-war
status;
(2) protection of noncombatants from the effects of hostilities; and
(3) compliance mechanisms, including external scrutiny, repression and punish-
ment of offenses, and the right of reprisal; and
in other armed conflicts—
(1) the extent of regulation by international law when those conflicts are non-
international; and
(2) the applicability of international law when those conflicts are partly interna-
tional and partly noninternational.
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jus in bello,48 evolution of law to accommodate potential need for preemp-
tive self-defense,49 the bifurcation of the LOAC between international
armed conflicts and non-international armed conflicts,50 the application of
the law to state and non-state actors,51 and the geographic applicability
and limitations of the LOAC to the “active conflict zone,”52 to name just a
few. P.W. Singer framed the question nicely when he asked, “[h]ow do we
catch up our twentieth century laws of war that are so old right now they
qualify for Medicare to these twenty-first century technologies?”53
The prescriptions for solving the current problem include calls for spe-
cific adjustments to discrete areas of the current LOAC, but Rosa Brooks
has argued for “a radical reconceptualization of national security law and
the international law of armed conflict.”54 If catching the law up to current
technologies, strategies, and tactics requires a “radical reconceptualiza-
tion” of the LOAC, it certainly behooves the international community to
be proactive in anticipating the future evolution of the LOAC to accom-
modate changes in future armed conflict.
The next Part of this article will briefly analyze elements of the future
battlefield, focusing on “places,” or where conflicts are fought; “actors,” or
by whom they are fought; and “means and methods,” or how they are
fought. The purpose of the analysis is to highlight areas of the LOAC that
will struggle to deal with the future changes that are likely to occur, and to
George H. Aldrich, The Hague Peace Conferences: The Laws of War on Land, 94 AM. J.
INT’L L. 42, 42 (2000).
48. Nathaniel Berman, Privileging Combat? Contemporary Conflict and the Legal
Construction of War, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1 (2004); Sean D. Murphy, Protean Jus ad
Bellum, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 22 (2009); Robert D. Sloane, The Cost of Conflation: Pre-
serving the Dualism of Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello in the Contemporary Law of War, 34
YALE J. INT’L L. 47 (2009).
49. W. Michael Reisman, Assessing Claims to Revise the Laws of War, 97 AM. J. INT’L
L. 82 (2003).
50. Brooks, supra note 5, at 711–14; Jensen, supra note 21; Francisco Forrest Martin,
Using International Human Rights Law for Establishing a Unified Use of Force Rule in the
Law of Armed Conflict, 64 SASK. L. REV. 347 (2001); Gabor Rona, Legal Frameworks to
Combat Terrorism: An Abundant Inventory of Existing Tools, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 499 (2005).
51. Kenneth Watkin, Canada/United States Military Interoperability and Humanitarian
Law Issues: Land Mines, Terrorism, Military Objectives, and Targeted Killing, 15 DUKE J.
COMP. & -INT’L L. 281, 281 (2005) (“The conduct of military operations at the commence-
ment of the 21st century has also shone a bright spotlight on traditional tensions in humanita-
rian law, such as the application of that law to conflicts between state and non-state actors.”).
52. Jennifer C. Daskal, The Geography of the Battlefield: A Framework for Detention
and Targeting Outside the ‘Hot’ Conflict Zone, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1165, 1212; Fre´de´ric
Me´gret, War and the Vanishing Battlefield, 9 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 131 (2011).
53. Singer, supra note 11.
54. Brooks, supra note 5, at 747. The author further states that “it is becoming more
and more difficult to know how to characterize, as a matter of law, the kinds of threats that
increasingly face the U.S. and other nations, and it is therefore becoming harder and harder
to determine the appropriate legal responses to these threats. The old categories have lost
their analytical and moral underpinnings, but we have not yet found alternative paradigms to
replace them.” Id. at 744.
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begin a discussion on how the LOAC needs to evolve to maintain its abil-
ity to regulate armed conflict in the future.
A. Places
The traditional paradigm of armed conflict assumes that at any given
time, it will be readily apparent where the armed conflict is taking place,
and where it is not. To put it another way, the traditional paradigm as-
sumes clear spatial boundaries between zones of war and zones of peace.55
For the entire history of mankind, armed conflict has been confined to
breathable air zones—the land, the surface of the ocean, and recently the
air above the land in which land-based aircraft can fly. Additionally, the
post-Westphalian system was built on the foundation of state sovereignty
and the clear demarcation and control of borders.56 Armed conflicts oc-
curred within specific spatial and temporal limits. As a result, the laws
governing armed conflict have been built around certain presumptions
about where armed conflict will occur. In the future, these presumptions
will no longer be true. The LOAC will have to adjust to account for the
emerging factors affecting where armed conflicts take place.
1. Emerging Factors
As technology advances, armed conflict will no longer be restricted to
breathable air zones. Instead, it will occur without respect to national bor-
ders, underground, on the seabed, in space and on celestial bodies such as
the moon, and across the newly recognized domain of cyberspace.57
a. Global Conflict
The phenomena of global conflict has already begun to stress the
LOAC58 as the United States has struggled to confront a transnational
non-state terrorist actor that does not associate itself with geographic
boundaries. As will be discussed in Subsection B, the ability to communi-
cate globally through social media will likely produce organized (armed)
groups that will not be bound by geographic boundaries and as such will
not see themselves as representing a specific geographic collective. Rather,
the boundaries will revolve around affiliations, interests, and ideologies.
As Mack Owens has written:
Thus multidimensional war in the future is likely to be character-
ized by distributed, weakly connected battlefields; unavoidable ur-
ban battles and unavoidable collateral damage exploited by the
55. Id. at 720.
56. Jensen, supra note 21, at 707–09.
57. See David Alexander, Pentagon to Treat Cyberspace as “Operational Domain”,
REUTERS (Jul. 14, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/14/us-usa-defense-cyber-
security-idUSTRE76D5FA20110714.
58. Me´gret, supra note 52, at 132 (arguing that the “death of the battlefield signifi-
cantly complicates the waging of war and may well herald the end of the laws of war as a way
to regulate violence”).
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adversary’s strategic communication; and highly vulnerable rear
areas. On such battlefields, friends and enemies are commingled,
and there is a constant battle for the loyalty of the population.59
This issue is amply illustrated through the U.S. practice of drone
strikes on terrorists associated with al-Qaeda but not located in Afghani-
stan.60 The focused outcry about U.S. reliance on authorities granted by
the law of armed conflict even though outside the geographic confines of
the recognized battlefield61 highlights the current paradigm’s assumptions
about the LOAC’s applications to territory. As global communications al-
low participants in armed conflict to be more widely dispersed across the
world, it is unlikely that states will allow themselves to be attacked by
transnational actors because they are not located within a specific geo-
graphic region that has been designated as the “battlefield.”
b. Seabed
Currently the seabed and even non-surface waters have seen very lit-
tle armed conflict.62 Submarine vessels have engaged surface vessels but
there has been almost no conflict between submarines and none from the
seabed. This is likely to change dramatically with technological improve-
ments. For example, China has developed submersibles that can reach 99.8
percent of world’s seabed.63 As more and more underwater vehicles be-
come unmanned, the need for breathable air dissipates. Underwater
drones will almost certainly become armed and underwater engagements
will quickly follow.
Similarly, the seabed will likely become militarized, once the need for
air is erased. Not only could sensors be used to track surface and subsur-
face traffic, but also armaments will likely soon follow and the seabed will
become another area where states will employ weapons systems.
59. Owens, supra note 3, at 71.
60. Cora Currier, Everything We Know So Far About Drone Strikes, PROPUBLICA
(Jan. 22, 2013), http://www.propublica.org/article/everything-we-know-so-far-about-drone-
strikes.
61. Daskal, supra note 52.
62. Two treaties provide limitations on certain military activities on the sea bed. See
Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under
Water, Aug. 5, 1963, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43; Treaty on the Prohibition of the
Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Sub-
soil Thereof, Feb. 11, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 701, 955 U.N.T.S. 115 [hereinafter Treaty on the Prohi-
bition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons on the Sea-Bed]. These agreements,
however, only apply to nuclear weapons and do not limit the transport or use of nuclear
weapons in the waters above the seabed.
63. Gordon G. Chang, China Explores the Seabed Near America, WORLD AFF. (July
25, 2011), http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/gordon-g-chang/china-explores-seabed-
near-america.
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c. Subterranean
Similar to the seabed, the ability to place weapons systems under-
ground and employ them effectively against an enemy is beginning to de-
velop.64 Not only is it almost certain that underground weapons will attack
surface targets, but it is also clear that they could be used to create surface
effects through underground explosions and other means of manipulation.
This will probably include the creation of earthquakes, tsunamis, and
other surface effects that will severely affect an enemy. This portion of the
earth is currently not weaponized,65 but it will be in the future.
d. Space and Celestial Bodies
Space and the free use of space have become vital to the functioning
of the modern military. In fact, “[a] Government Accountability Office
report . . . showed major Defense space acquisition programs ‘have in-
creased by about $11.6 billion’—321 percent—from initial estimates for
fiscal years 2011 through 2016.”66
U.S. Air Force Gen. William Shelton, who is the head of Space Com-
mand, recently stated that “[o]ur assured access to space and cyberspace is
foundational to today’s military operations and to our ability to project
power whenever and wherever needed across the planet.”67 Similarly,
Army Lt. Gen. Richard Formica stated, “If the Army wants to shoot,
move or communicate, it needs space.”68 Formica added that because of
the Army’s dependency on these systems, they “have to be defended.”69
These quotes refer mostly to the use of satellites, but despite current
legal restrictions, it is very likely that the use of the moon and potentially
other celestial bodies will soon follow.70 Space systems such as satellites
64. See Geoff Manaugh, Drone Landscapes, Intelligent Geotextiles, Geographic Coun-
termeasures, BLDG BLOG (Jan. 11, 2012), http://bldgblog.blogspot.com/2012/01/drone-land-
scapes-intelligent.html.
65. See Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons on the Sea-
Bed, supra note 62.
66. Walter Pincus, Hearings Show Our Dependence on Military Space Technology,





70. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty limits military activities in outer space. Article IV
states:
States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any
objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruc-
tion, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer
space in any other manner.
The Moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the
Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes. The establishment of military bases, in-
stallations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of
military maneuvers on celestial bodies shall be forbidden. The use of military per-
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can be defended and attacked both from space and from the ground. Both
China and the United States have conducted recent anti-satellite opera-
tions and established that both have that capability.71 Space has already
begun to be weaponized72 and that trend will continue and increase in
speed and lethality.
e. Cyberspace
Much has already been written about cyberspace. The Chinese have
created a separate department of their military to handle the military as-
pects of cyberspace.73 The United States recently created Cyber Com-
mand to specifically plan and control U.S. military cyber operations.74
Army General Keith Alexander not only commands Cyber Command but
also heads the National Security Agency.75 Currently, 140 nations either
already have or are actively building cyber capabilities within their mili-
tary,76 with Brazil being one of the most recent to make that decision.77
sonnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes shall not be pro-
hibited. The use of any equipment or facility necessary for peaceful exploration of
the Moon and other celestial bodies shall also not be prohibited.
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610
U.N.T.S. 205.
71. Amy Chang, Indigenous Weapons Development in China’s Military Modernization,
U.S.-CHINA ECON. & SEC. REV. COMMISSION (Apr. 5, 2012), http://www.uscc.gov/
researchpapers/2012/China-Indigenous-Military-Developments-Final-Draft-03-April2012
.pdf; Angela Webb, Joint Effort Made Satellite Success Possible, FREE REPUBLIC (Feb. 26,
2008), http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1976747/posts; Concern Over China’s Mis-
sile Test, BBC NEWS (Jan. 19, 2007), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6276543.stm.
72. Blake & Imburgia, supra note 33, 173–76; Jameson W. Crockett, Space Warfare in
the Here and Now: The Rules of Engagement for U.S. Weaponized Satellites in the Current
Legal Space Regime, 77 J. AIR L. & COM. 671 (2012).
73. Tania Branigan, Chinese Army to Target Cyber War Threat, THE GUARDIAN (July
22, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jul/22/chinese-army-cyber-war-department.
74. Andrew Gray, Pentagon Approves Creation of Cyber Command, REUTERS (June
23, 2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/06/24/us-usa-pentagon-cyber-idUSTRE55M78
920090624.
75. Biography: Director of the NSA/CSS, NAT’L SEC. AGENCY, http://www.nsa.gov/
about/leadership/bio_alexander.shtml (last visited Mar. 9, 2014).
76. Susan W. Brenner & Leo L. Clarke, Civilians in Cyberwarfare: Casualties, 13 SMU
SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 249, 249 (2010); Graham H. Todd, Armed Attack in Cyberspace: Deter-
ring Asymmetric Warfare with an Asymmetric Definition, 64 A.F. L. REV. 65, 96 (2009).
77. Pedro Ozores, Eyeing Major Events, Brazil to Form Body to Fight Cyber Attacks,
BNAMERICAS (Dec. 28, 2012), http://www.bnamericas.com/news/technology/eyeing-major-
events-brazil-to-form-body-to-fight-cyber-attacks.
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Recent revelations concerning Stuxnet78 and Flame79 make it clear
that nations are already using cyberspace to conduct military activities that
cause harm similar to kinetic operations. Nations are also stealing technol-
ogies and trade secrets through cyber operations.80 These cyber thefts
have not yet been equated with an attack but may be so treated in the
future as the seriousness of the thefts continues and increases. Cyberspace
has certainly been militarized by states and will continue to be so, and on
an increasing basis.81
One of the most important aspects of cyberspace is that, unlike the
weaponization of space or the seabed, it does not require a nation to con-
duct “military” activities in cyberspace. There are numerous examples of
private hackers, organized groups, and business organizations using the
Internet to do great harm to both private and public entities.82 The acces-
sibility of the militarization of cyberspace makes it somewhat unique in
the future of armed conflict, which will be discussed below.
Most important for this discussion is the lack of boundaries in cyber-
space. While the computer used to conduct the “attack” must be in one
geographic location and work through a server in a specific geographic
location, the lethal electrons will traverse many nations in their path to the
requested destination. Further, to this point, states have been unwilling to
take responsibility for cyber “attacks” that emanate from within their geo-
graphic boundaries,83 leaving only criminal process as the means of seek-
ing redress for non-state-actor-sponsored attacks, a process that has
seldom proven successful.84
2. Emerging Law
The emerging factors discussed above will create stress on the current
underpinnings and general principles of the LOAC. Fundamental ideas,
such as territorial sovereignty, upon which the state-centric LOAC is
based, will diminish in importance. The current doctrine of neutrality will
78. Amr Thabet, Stuxnet Malware Analysis Paper, CODEPROJECT (Sept. 9, 2011), http:/
/www.codeproject.com/Articles/246545/Stuxnet-Malware-Analysis-Paper.
79. Full Analysis of Flame’s Command and Control Servers, SECURELIST (Sept. 17,
2012, 1:00 PM), http://www.securelist.com/en/blog/750/Full_Analysis_of_Flame_s_Command
_Control_servers.
80. See, e.g., Peter Foster, China Chief Suspect in Major Cyber Attack, DAILY TELE-
GRAPH (Aug. 3, 2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/8679658/China-chief-sus-
pect-in-major-cyber-attack.html.
81. Noah Shachtman, DARPA Looks to Make Cyberwar Routine with Secret “Plan
X”, WIRED, (Aug. 21, 2012), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/08/plan-x/.
82. Mathew J. Schwartz, Anonymous Attacks North Korea, Denies Targeting South,
INFO. WEEK (June 25, 2013), http://www.informationweek.com/security/attacks/anonymous-
attacks-north-korea-denies-tar/240157253; Global Network of Hackers Steal $45 Million from
ATMs, CNBC (May 10, 2013), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100726799.
83. See, e.g., The Cyber Raiders Hitting Estonia, BBC NEWS, May 17, 2007, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6665195.stm.
84. See, e.g., Clifford J. Levy, What’s Russian for ‘Hacker’?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21,
2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/21/weekinreview/21levy.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
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be impossible to apply. Certain specific international agreements that im-
pact the LOAC will likely be ignored or abrogated as technological capa-
bilities increase. As these stresses develop, the LOAC will need to adjust
to maintain its relevance to future armed conflicts.
a. Territorial Sovereignty
Since the inauguration of the Westphalian system, one of the indicia of
statehood is a designated territory. This was memorialized in the Monte-
video Convention85 and has been part of recent discussions on statehood
in both Kosovo86 and Palestine.87 Assumed in this attachment of territory
to statehood is the authority and obligation to control that territory, in-
cluding the use of force within designated borders and the use of force
from within designated borders that will have effects outside the
territory.88
It is this assumption that led to the bifurcation of the LOAC into rules
governing international armed conflicts (IACs) and separate rules gov-
erning non-international armed conflicts (NIACs).89 When the United
States was faced with conducting an armed conflict with a transnational
actor after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, it struggled to apply the appropri-
ate rules.90 It seems clear that applying the NIAC rules to a transnational
armed conflict was clearly outside the meaning of the Geneva Conven-
tions as originally signed.91 Despite this, the U.S. Supreme Court eventu-
ally determined that certain LOAC provisions formed a minimum set of
rights that applied to all armed conflicts, regardless of unbounded
geography.92
It is almost certain that armed conflicts in the future will continue to
be carried out by organized groups who will be found outside a limited
geographic scope. To the extent that the LOAC would prevent the applica-
85. Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat.
3097, 165 LNTS 19.
86. William Thomas Worster, Law, Politics, and the Conception of the State in State
Recognition Theory, 27 B.U. INT’L L.J. 115 (2009).
87. JOHN QUIGLEY, THE STATEHOOD OF PALESTINE: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE
MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT 209–11 (2010).
88. See PHILIP BOBBITT, THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES: WAR, PEACE, AND THE COURSE
OF HISTORY 81–90, 96–118 (2002); Frederic Gilles Sourgens, Positivism, Humanism, and He-
gemony: Sovereignty and Security for Our Time, 25 PENN. ST. INT’L L. REV. 433, 443 (2006)
(citing sixteenth-century writer Bodin as defining sovereignty as “the absolute and perpetual
power of the commonwealth resting in the hands of the state”).
89. See generally Jensen, supra note 21; James G. Stewart, Towards a Single Definition
of Armed Conflict in International Humanitarian Law: A Critique of Internationalized Armed
Conflict, 85 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 313 (2003), available at http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/
siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/5PYAXX/$File/irrc_850_Stewart.pdf (describing the history of the devel-
opment of the Geneva Conventions).
90. Jensen, supra note 21, at 685–88.
91. ANTHONY CULLEN, THE CONCEPT OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT IN
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 36–39 (2010).
92. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 628–32 (2006).
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tion of force in accordance with current U.S. practice, a reinterpretation of
the LOAC will be necessary. Additionally, the specific application of
LOAC provisions, such as non-movement of security detainees,93 would
need to be reinterpreted in light of transnational groups during armed
conflict.
Future conflicts will also raise questions about the ability of states to
control the use of force from within their territory during armed conflicts
in the same way as they currently do. For example, even now, during
peacetime, nations have claimed that they cannot be responsible for cyber
activities that emanate from within their borders.94 The obligation to pre-
vent transboundary harm that was clearly articulated in the Trail Smelter
Arbitration,95 and made applicable to situations of armed conflict in the
Corfu Channel case,96 has not prevented states from disclaiming responsi-
bility for cyber actions from within their borders during armed conflict.97
As will be discussed below, the globalization of social networking will
allow linkages between people of many different nationalities who might
take forceful actions during armed conflict. These individuals will be act-
ing not as citizens of any particular country but as members of transna-
tional ideological groupings, and nations will find these individuals
difficult to control. While the inability of a state to control all the actions
of its individual residents is not new, the capability for those residents to
readily harness state-level violence, such as cyber tools, and then direct
that state-level violence across boundaries is relatively new and will only
become more possible with technological advances.
The transnational nature of fighters and the decreasing ability of states
to control the emanation of state-level violence from within their sover-
eign territory will likely frustrate the current understanding of the applica-
tion of the LOAC. The idea of a geographically limited conflict is difficult
to maintain when organized (social networking) groups are using state-
level violence from multiple (neutral) states across the world.98
93. Geneva Convention, supra note 18, art. 49.
94. Shashank Bengali, Ken Dilanian & Alexandra Zavis, Chinese Cyber Attack Disclo-
sures, L.A. TIMES (June 5, 2013),http://timelines.latimes.com/la-fg-china-cyber-disclosures-
timeline/; see also, Cyber Intelligence: Setting the Landscape for an Emerging Discipline, IN-
TELLIGENCE & NAT’L SEC. ALLIANCE 8 (Sept. 2011), https://images.magnetmail.net/images/
clients/INSA/attach/INSA_CYBER_INTELLIGENCE_2011.pdf.
95. Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905, 1965–66 (1941).
96. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 9).
97. See John Markoff, Before the Gunfire, Cyberattacks, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/13/technology/13cyber.html.
98. See Mathew J. Schwartz, Anonymous Takes Down North Korean Websites, IN-
FORMATIONWEEK (Apr. 16, 2013), http://www.informationweek.com/security/attacks/anony-
mous-takes-down-north-korean-websit/240152985 (describing the hacktivist group
Anonymous’s disruption of North Korean websites).
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b. Neutrality
As implied above, the doctrine of neutrality will also come under pres-
sure in future conflicts where the geography of the battlefield is less con-
fined. States that are not participants in armed conflict and that wish to
maintain their neutrality will find it difficult to effectively do so when indi-
viduals’ actions from within their geographic borders will involve state-
level violence. For example, assume a citizen of a neutral country decides
to conduct a cyber attack against one of the belligerent countries. To main-
tain its neutrality, the neutral country must prevent such attacks.99 Alter-
natively, the attacked country may use self-help to stop the attacks. This is
not new.100 However, what is new is the level of violence that individuals
can readily muster and the global scale of organization and reach of these
individual participants.
When individuals from eighty neutral countries can organize them-
selves to attack simultaneously and instantaneously with state-level vio-
lence at different targets in the belligerent state, the doctrine of neutrality
and a belligerent’s ability to respond become almost meaningless. The bel-
ligerent state may not have time to determine the neutral state’s willing-
ness or ability to intervene or stop the attack. Under the current LOAC
doctrine of neutrality, such activities would likely lead to the belligerent
declaring the neutral as a hostile party to the conflict.101
Additionally, when an individual launches a cyber attack, the malware
will inevitably flow through the infrastructure of neutral states. Under Ar-
ticle 8 of Hague V, “A neutral Power is not called upon to forbid or re-
strict the use on behalf of the belligerents of telegraph or telephone cables
or of wireless telegraphy apparatus belonging to it or to companies or pri-
vate individuals.”102 This provision is one of the very few codified provi-
sions in the LOAC that refer to neutrality and electronic communications.
Yet, when considering Article 8 specifically, the group of experts who
wrote the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber
Warfare (Tallinn Manual) could not agree on its specific applicability to
cyber operations.103 The experts did agree that the provisions of the
LOAC applicable to neutrality were difficult to apply in the context of
cyber war and “need to be interpreted.”104 This approach by the Tallinn
99. Hague Convention (V) Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and
Persons in Case of War on Land art. 5, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2310, 1 Bevans 654 [hereinafter
Hague Convention (V)].
100. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE NAVY, THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
NAVAL OPERATIONS, ch. 7.3 (2007) [hereinafter COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK]; R.Y. Jennings,
The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT’L L. 82, 89 (1938); Catherine Lotrionte, State
Sovereignty and Self-Defense in Cyberspace: A Normative Framework for Balancing Legal
Rights, 26 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 825 (2012).
101. See COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 100, at ch. 7.2.
102. Hague Convention (V), supra note 99, art. 8.
103. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 42.
104. Id.; see generally Eric Talbot Jensen, Sovereignty and Neutrality in Cyber Conflict,
35 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 815 (2012).
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Manual should signal to the international community the need to look
more closely at the LOAC, at least within the context of cyberspace, and
acknowledge that review and revision is necessary.
c. International Agreements
Finally, though not strictly a matter of the LOAC, there are numerous
international agreements that affect the militarization of specific areas and
the application of the LOAC to activities in these areas. For example, the
Outer Space Treaty limits some military activities in space but has no spe-
cific provision prohibiting the use of conventional weapons (or for exam-
ple, lasers) in outer space that may be used against targets in orbit, on
celestial bodies, or on the Earth.105
Other treaties106 also limit or affect the use of Earth’s “places” for
military purposes. However, these agreements, to the extent that states
will continue to follow them in the future, serve only to limit states. As will
be discussed below, the actors of armed conflict are going to dramatically
change and increase, including a significant variety of non-state entities
that will have no legal obligations under these international agreements
and may or may not be effectively constrained by states. As emphasized
below, the LOAC will have to reach out to these other actors to regulate
Earth’s “places” during future armed conflict.
B. Actors
The potential range of ‘new actors’ whose actions have repercussions
at the international level is of course vast. While many of these ‘new ac-
tors’ have in fact been around for some time, they have called into ques-
tion—and will continue to call into question—some of the more
traditional assumptions on which the international legal system is
based.107
From the very beginnings of human conflict, fighters have created
rules to govern their war-like conduct.108 As argued by Krauss and Lacey,
105. See Ricky J. Lee, The Jus Ad Bellum In Spatialis: The Exact Content and Practical
Implications of the Law on the Use of Force in Outer Space, 29 J. SPACE L. 93, 95–98 (2003);
see also P.J. Blount, Limits on Space Weapons: Incorporating the Law of War into the Corpus
Juris Spatialis, Int’l Austronautical Fed’n, IAC-08.E8.3.5 (2008); Deborah Housen-Couriel,
Disruption of Satellites ad Bellum and in Bello: Launching a New Paradigm of Convergence,
45 ISR. L. REV. 431 (2012).
106. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 3; Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons on the Sea-
Bed, supra note 62.
107. Kellenberger, supra note 22.
108. See William C. Bradford, Barbarians at the Gates: A Post-September 11th Proposal
to Rationalize the Laws of War, 73 MISS. L.J. 639, 641 n.12, 697–710 (2004); Gregory P.
Noone, The History and Evolution of the Law of War Prior to World War II, 47 NAVAL L.
REV. 176, 182–85 (2000); Thomas C. Wingfield, Chivalry in the Use of Force, 32 U. TOL. L.
REV. 111, 114 (2001).
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these were rules “written by the utilitarians for the warriors.”109 While the
quality and content of these rules ebbed and flowed over time, this pro-
gression resulted in a definition of a combatant as an agent for a state that
provided authorities for individuals to take part in otherwise illegal con-
duct (such as killing others) so long as that conduct was in compliance with
rules established by the state.110 Because these rules were initially based
on reciprocal application, they established strict qualifications for who
could act with this impunity—rules that were codified in the 1899/1907
Hague Convention111 and in greater detail in the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tion for the Protection of Prisoners of War.112
Concurrently, the LOAC has developed rules for the treatment of
those not acting as fighters but as the victims of armed conflict. The treat-
ment has moved from a point where non-fighters were treated as the spoils
of war,113 to a time when non-fighters were considered part of the target-
able enemy,114 to the current paradigm where militaries are strictly pro-
hibited from targeting civilians,115 so long as they do not “take a direct
part in hostilities.”116
As a result of these provisions, actors on the battlefield are divided
into either combatants or civilians and, in fact, are defined in relation to
each other. As Article 50 of GPI states, “A civilian is any person who does
not belong to one of the categories of persons referred to in Article 4A(1),
(2), (3), and (6) of the Third Convention and in Article 43 of this Proto-
col.”117 This clean division between two types of battlefield actors is
among the current LOAC principles that will be stressed in future armed
conflict.
1. Emerging Factors
The seemingly clear bifurcation between combatants and civilians that
was established in 1949 was already eroding in the armed conflicts leading
up to the 1970s, causing the ICRC to recommend relaxing the require-
109. Eric S. Krauss & Michael O. Lacey, Utilitarian vs. Humanitarian: The Battle Over
the Law of War, PARAMETERS, Summer 2002, at 73, 73.
110. Jensen, supra note 21, at 710–11.
111. Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annex to Conven-
tion (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 1, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat.
2277, 1 Bevans 631, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/195?OpenDocument [here-
inafter Hague Regulations].
112. See Geneva Convention, supra note 18, at art. 4.
113. 3 THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949: COMMENTARY, GENEVA CON-
VENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 45 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1960),
available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/GC_1949-III.pdf [hereinafter Geneva
Conventions Commentary].
114. FRANCIS LIEBER, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE
UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD arts. 15-25 (1863), available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/
FULL/110?OpenDocument.
115. Protocol I, supra note 9, arts. 51.2, 52.1.
116. Id. at art. 51.3.
117. Id. at art. 50.1.
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ments for qualification of a combatant which was then codified in GPI.118
Recent armed conflicts have demonstrated the difficulty of determining
when a civilian takes “a direct part in hostilities.”119
Future armed conflict will undoubtedly increase the consternation
over defining actors on the battlefield. The differentiation between civil-
ians and combatants will become more blurred as global technologies al-
low linkages and associations among people that were not possible in 1949
or 1977. The following sections analyze emerging factors that will stress
LOAC understandings of civilians, organized armed groups, and
combatants.
a. Civilians
The current LOAC is clear that “the civilian population as such, as
well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack . . . unless and
for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.”120 Despite the seem-
ing clarity of the rule, applying the rule to civilians on the future battlefield
is surprisingly difficult.121 This rule will be discussed in two parts below,
the first dealing with the prohibition on attacking civilians and the second
on the meaning of direct participation in hostilities.
i. Prohibition on Attacking Civilians
Future technologies, such as the virology discussed in the scenario at
the beginning of this Article, will be enhanced or facilitated by using the
civilian population to either spread or host the eventual weapon. Attack-
ers who use viruses or nanotechnologies or genetic mutators will find their
attacks facilitated by using the civilian population to propagate their weap-
ons. The nanobot will be released generally into the population and then
trigger its payload based on finding the correct DNA sequence or other
similar marker.
Cyber attackers will find the same methodologies useful. They will
create malware that spreads broadly throughout civilian systems until it
finds the specific computer system it is designed to attack and then con-
duct its attack. The details on these means and methods will be discussed
in greater detail below, but the important aspect of these attacks for this
section is that they are facilitated or hosted by civilians or civilian objects.
These types of systems are unlike prior chemical or biological weap-
ons because they do not necessarily have deleterious effects on the host
and certainly don’t take full effect on the host, but rather save their full
118. Id. at art. 44.3. Although there is no official statement on this point, it appears that
this provision is one of the reasons that the United States has not ratified Protocol I.
See Michael J. Matheson, Session One: The United States Position on the Relation of Custom-
ary International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2
AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 419 (1987).
119. Protocol I, supra note 9, art. 51.3.
120. Id. at arts. 51.2, 51.3.
121. See R. George Wright, Combating Civilian Casualties: Rules and Balancing in the
Developing Law of War, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 129, 129–36 (2003).
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effect for the target. Thus, the civilian or civilian object can facilitate the
attack without feeling much, if any, of the effects. This approach to dis-
seminating a weapon system will stress the LOAC as future technologies
continue to develop.
ii. Direct Participation in Hostilities
Not all civilians enjoy complete protection from being attacked. As
GPI states, civilians forfeit their protection from attack if they take a di-
rect part in hostilities.122 The actual meaning of these words and their
practical application on the battlefield has been a matter of great de-
bate.123 In response to the debate, the ICRC issued its “Interpretive Gui-
dance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities”124 (DPH
Guidance), which was intended to provide guidance on what actions by
civilians rose to the level of direct participation. While this publication is
not without controversy125 and certainly does not purport to be a state-
ment of the law, it provides an interesting basis for analysis.
The DPH Guidance lays out three cumulative criteria for a civilian to
be directly participating.126 The first is that there must be a certain thresh-
old of harm.127 The harm should “adversely affect the military operations
or military capacity of a party to an armed conflict, or . . . inflict death,
injury or destruction on persons or objects protected against direct at-
tack.”128 The second criterion is that there must be direct causation.129
The act must be designed to directly cause harm, or part of a concrete and
coordinated military operation of which the act constitutes an integral
part.130 Finally, there must be a belligerent nexus between the act and the
conflict.131 In other words, the act must be designed to directly cause the
required threshold of harm in support of a party to the conflict.132
However “direct participation” is defined, future weapons systems
and tactics will likely increase the number of civilians who become actors
on the battlefield, either intentionally or otherwise. Some examples follow.
122. Protocol I, supra note 9, art. 51.3.
123. Nils Melzer, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostili-
ties, 90 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 991, 993–94 (2008), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/
files/other/irrc-872-reports-documents.pdf.
124. Id. at 1006–09.
125. Kenneth Watkin, Opportunity Lost: Organized Armed Groups and the ICRC “Di-
rect Participation in Hostilities” Interpretive Guidance, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 641
(2010).
126. Melzer, supra note 123, at 1016.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1019.
130. Id. at 1019–25.
131. Id. at 1025.
132. Id. at 1026.
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a) Tools
In the scenario from The Atlantic at the beginning of this Article,
Samantha has no idea that she is playing a role in the attack on the Presi-
dent of the United States. She is undoubtedly an innocent instrumentality
or tool in the attack plan. Nevertheless, she is a key component of the
attack and her ingestion of the virus and subsequent spreading of the virus
is vital to the operation. Is she directly participating in hostilities though
she has no intention of taking part? Does her lack of intention make
targeting her any less vital?
Many other future means and methods of warfare will use civilians as
tools in the attack as well, including genomics and nanotechnologies.
Cyber operations already struggle with this issue.133 The use of civilians as
tools to facilitate advanced technological attacks requires a reconsidera-
tion of the rules on direct participation.
b) Transnational Communities of Interest
The rise of social networking and its ability to instantaneously link
together individuals and groups from across the globe is just beginning to
be explored as a social phenomenon. Negative aspects of this global
linkage are already being felt across various levels of society, including the
business world.134
Jeffrey Walker has termed these groups “instantaneous transnational
communities of interest” and argues that “It’s simply no longer necessary
to have a state sponsor for an interested group of people to effect changes
within the international community.”135 Anthony Lake, former National
Security Advisor to President Clinton, described these instantaneous
transnational communities of interest as “technology enabling local groups
to forge vast alliances across borders, and . . . a whole host of new actors
challenging, confronting, and sometimes competing with governments on
turf that was once their exclusive domain.”136
Social networking’s effects on armed conflict have also already begun
to surface137 and will only increase over time. As Philip Bobbitt has writ-
133. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 42, at 119–20; Collin Allan, Attribution Issues in
Cyberspace, 13 CHI.-KENT J. INT’L & COMP. L. 55, 57 (2013).
134. BOB HAYES & KATHLEEN KOTWICA, TREND RESEARCH: CRISIS MANAGEMENT AT
THE SPEED OF THE INTERNET, SECURITY EXECUTIVE COUNCIL (2013), available at https://
www.securityexecutivecouncil.com/secstore/index.php?main_page=product_info&cPath=77_
66&products_id=361.
135. Jeffrey K. Walker, Thomas P. Keenan Memorial Lecture: The Demise of the Na-
tion-State, the Dawn of New Paradigm Warfare, and a Future Profession of Arms, 51 A.F. L.
REV. 323, 329–30 (2001).
136. Id. at 133, 330 (citing ANTHONY LAKE, 6 NIGHTMARES 281–82 (2000)).
137. See George Griffin, Egypt’s Uprising: Tracking the Social Media Factor, PBS (Apr.
20, 2011), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/middle_east/jan-june11/revsocial_04-19
.html.
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ten, “The internet enabled the aggregation of dissatisfied and malevolent
persons into global networks.”138
Audrey Kurth Cronin likens social networking to the leve´e en masse
and argues that it allows cyber mobilization of people across the entire
globe on issues of common ideology.139 She writes:
The evolving character of communications today is altering the
patterns of popular mobilization, including both the means of par-
ticipation and the ends for which wars are fought. . . Today’s mo-
bilization may not be producing masses of soldiers, sweeping
across the European continent, but it is effecting an underground
uprising whose remarkable effects are being played out on the
battlefield every day.140
As social networking continues to embed itself as a societal norm, people
will begin to view themselves less as Americans, or Germans, or Iranians,
and more as members of global ideologies created, maintained, and mobil-
ized over social media.141
Through social media, individuals will be able to recruit, provide fi-
nancial support, collect intelligence, pass strategies and information, for-
ward ideas and instructions for munitions, create and solidify plans of
action, and coordinate attacks. These events will occur far from any ex-
isting battlefield but will have profound and immediate effects on hostili-
ties, creating a global group of direct participants who will meet the legal
criteria for targeting.
c) Hacktivists
The role of hacktivists has already been demonstrated in conflicts be-
tween Russia and Estonia142 and between Russia and Georgia.143 Though
there has been no evidence to date to attribute these actions to states,
David Hoffman argues that “States like China and Russia now encourage
groups of freelance hackers to do their dirty work, allowing plausible
deniability.”144
Additionally, other groups of hacktivists, which are clearly not state-
sponsored or state-aligned, have been able to apply state-level force and
create significant effects in armed conflicts. For example, the global collec-
138. Philip C. Bobbitt, Inter Arma Enim Non Silent Leges, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 253,
259 (2012).
139. See, e.g., Audrey Kurth Cronin, Cyber-Mobilization: The New Leve´e en Masse,
PARAMETERS, Summer 2006, at 77, 77.
140. Id. at 84–85.
141. See Thomas J. Holt & Max Kilger, Examining Willingness to Attack Critical Infra-
structure Online and Offline, 58 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 798 (2012).
142. Allan, supra note 133, at 59.
143. Id.
144. David E. Hoffman, The New Virology: From Stuxnet to Biobombs, the Future of
War by Other Means, FOREIGN POL’Y, Mar.-Apr. 2011, available at http://www.foreignpolicy
.com/articles/2011/02/22/the_new_virology.
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tive “Anonymous” has engaged in activities against states during armed
conflict with the intent to influence government behavior.145
Because hacktivists participate along a spectrum of activities with va-
rying associations, it is very difficult to determine each individual’s level of
participation. Unless the collective work of a hacktivist group rises to the
level of an organized armed group (see below), it is difficult to treat it as a
collective when making targeting determinations. Many individuals,
though part of the organization, may just be tools (see above) on any spe-
cific operation.
In addition to groups, individuals often act alone in this capacity and
can also cause great damage. One of the first monumental “hacks” in the
United States was the “solar sunrise,” which ended up being the work of
three individuals—a man in Israel and two teenagers in California.146
Hacktivism is unique to computer operations, but civilian activism is
not. As the world progresses toward future armed conflict, activists and
activist groups in other areas will certainly coalesce. Genomics and na-
notechnology will have their own Cap’n Capsid and the international com-
munity will have to figure out how to deal with them under the LOAC.
d) “Arms” Dealers
As is discussed below in Section II(C), a wide variety of new means
and methods of warfare will emerge as future technologies develop. Simi-
lar to computer malware from the hacktivists of the prior section and
bioengineers from the scenario at the beginning of this article, some of
these new technologies will not be limited to development by states. Some
will be developed and marketed by individuals, organized groups, criminal
organizations, and corporations. There is already a large market for cyber
“arms” that is very lucrative and is sourced almost exclusively by non-state
actors.147
Some of these arms dealers may also be users of the arms, which will
make their legal classification simpler; but many will not be users, but
mere producers. For them, this will be a business opportunity, just as it is
for many contemporary arms dealers who deal in traditional arms. How-
ever, the spread of technology and the needs of future armed conflict will
open this line of work to a much broader and previously innocuous group
of individuals. At some point, do these creators of modern arms become
145. See Jana Winter & Jeremy A. Kaplan, Communications Blackout Doesn’t Deter
Hackers Targeting Syrian Regime, FOX NEWS (Nov. 30, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/tech/
2012/11/30/hackers-declare-war-on-syria/#ixzz2Ht69GA1J.
146. Kevin Poulsen, Solar Sunrise Hacker ‘Analyzer’ Escapes Jail, THE REGISTER (June
15, 2001), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2001/06/15/solar_sunrise_hacker_analyzer_escapes/.
The FBI made a documentary about the hacks. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Solar Sunrise
Documentary, SECURITY TUBE, http://www.securitytube.net/video/189 (last visited Mar. 9,
2014).
147. See Michael Riley & Ashlee Vance, Cyber Weapons: The New Arms Race, BUSI-
NESS WEEK (July 20, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/cyber-weapons-the-new-
arms-race-07212011.html.
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participants in the conflict? If not, can they assume that they can continue
to take these actions with relative impunity?
e) Nongovernmental Organizations
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) deserve mention here also.
Though they are unlikely to become actors on the future battlefield, they
are expanding their participation in international governance.148 One
need only look at their efforts in the area of anti-personnel landmines to
see how significant an effect NGOs can have in the formulation and altera-
tion of the LOAC.149 It seems likely that the trend of greater influence by
NGOs will increase and that as the international community struggles to
evolve the LOAC in response to future places, actors, and means and
methods of warfare, NGOs will have a seat at the table. Their involvement
in law formulation may provide a vehicle for the incorporation of each
NGO’s individual agenda, whatever that may be. While this may or may
not result in positive effects on LOAC development, the point is that
NGOs’ role is increasing which is likely to lead to different results than in
the past.
b. Organized “Armed” Groups
One of the great clarifications urged by the DPH Guidance is the rec-
ognition that civilians often form themselves into organized armed groups
and that membership in these groups should result, to varying degrees, in a
forfeiture of civilian protections.150 These groups, in many varieties, are
likely to increase in future armed conflict. Some examples are discussed
below.
i. Non-traditional “Armed” Groups
One of the most important potential changes to the idea of organized
armed groups in the future is what it means to be armed. In the discussion
above, transnational communities of interest and hacktivist groups were
treated as individuals who might directly participate in hostilities. This was
based on a more traditional view of “armed,” meaning kinetic, weapons.
However, many future technologies will produce, as in the scenario at the
beginning of this article, weapons or things that can be used as weapons
that are very different than the traditional view of “arms.”
For example, is “Anonymous” an organized armed group? It pos-
sesses state-level force with its ability to infiltrate and affect governmental
(and corporate) computer systems. Would a transnational community of
interest that has gathered DNA samples on world leaders and is willing to
148. Steve Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Gov-
ernance, 18 MICH. J. INT’L L. 183, 183 (1997).
149. Walker, supra note 135, at 330.
150. For example, the ICRC’s DPH Guidance allows for targeting based on member-
ship in an organized armed group when combined with a continuous combat function within
the organization. Melzer, supra note 123, at 1006–09.
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sell them to the highest bidder be an organized armed group? Or a group
of individuals who work together to build a virus that will transport a ge-
nomic mutator? Or a transnational group of concerned scientists who pub-
lish openly nanotechnology processes or offer their services so everyone
can enjoy the benefits of nanotechnology?
The future is likely to present numerous groups of varying composi-
tion and intent that do not possess traditional arms, but control or create
the means to do great harm. These groups will stress the current applica-
tion of targeting law, including the determination of lawful targets (as will
be discussed below), even with the clarification of organized armed
groups.
ii. Traditional “Armed” Groups
In addition to the non-traditional armed groups, the types and activi-
ties of more traditional armed groups will also expand. Four examples are
discussed briefly below.
a) Private Security Companies
Much has been written recently concerning the use of private contrac-
tors, and particularly private security companies (PSC).151 The use of con-
tractors in current military operations has added pressures to the
definition of actors on the battlefield.152 Private contractors are involved
in providing a wide array of services153 and according to the ICRC, the
trend of militaries outsourcing traditional military functions to private
contractors is “likely to increase in the years ahead.”154
151. John R. Crook, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to Interna-
tional Law: International Law and non-State Actors: United States Supports Conclusion of
Code of Conduct for Security Companies, 105 AM. J. INT’L L. 156 (2011); Daniel P. Ridlon,
Contractors or Illegal Combatants? The Status of Armed Contractors in Iraq, 62 A.F. L. REV.
199 (2008).
152. FROM MERCENARIES TO MARKET: THE RISE AND REGULATION OF PRIVATE MILI-
TARY COMPANIES (Simon Chesterman & Chia Lehnardt eds., 2007); Eric Talbot Jensen,
Combatant Status: It is Time for Intermediate Levels of Recognition for Partial Compliance, 46
VA. J. INT’L L. 214 (2005); Christopher J. Mandernach, Warrior Without Law: Embracing a
Spectrum of Status for Military Actors, 7 APPALACHIAN J. L. 137 (2007).
153. Greg Miller & Julie Tate, CIA’s Global Response Staff Emerging From the
Shadows After Incidents in Libya and Pakistan, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2012, available at http:/
/articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-12-26/world/36015677_1_security-for-cia-officers-cia-com-
pound-benghazi; Craig Whitlock, U.S Expands Secret Intelligence Operations in Africa,
WASH. POST (June 13, 2012), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-06-13/world/
35462541_1_burkina-faso-air-bases-sahara.
154. Kellenberger, supra note 22.
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In response to abuses,155 good work is already being done in this
area156 and more will continue to be done. However, this work is unlikely
to constrain how these groups are used in the future. Governments will
continue to hire PSCs to provide security to people and places on the bat-
tlefield. Even if not intentionally, the PSCs will continue to find them-
selves in the midst of situations requiring the use of force. It is quite
possible that at some future point, some states will contract out their en-
tire state armed forces and designate them as combatants representing the
state. If this occurs, significant businesses will arise whose purpose is to
provide state forces for hire. These groups of fighters, though likely com-
pliant with the LOAC, will also be loyal to their paymaster rather than a
specific state.
b) Corporate Participation and Armies
In addition to private armies for hire, corporations will do even more
to provide their own security, especially in regions of instability. Exx-
onMobil in Indonesia and Talisman Energy in Sudan have already “hired”
and controlled national military forces to protect their business inter-
ests.157 Past corporate involvement in armed conflict includes “unlawful
taking of property, forced labor, displacement of populations, severe dam-
age to the environment, and the manufacture and trading of prohibited
weapons.”158 Recent events where corporate assets were attacked and em-
ployees held hostage159 would increase and cause corporations to recon-
sider their protective posture.
155. Press Release, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Academi/Blackwater Charged and
Enters Deferred Prosecution Agreement (Aug. 7, 2012), available at http://www.fbi.gov/char-
lotte/press-releases/2012/academi-blackwater-charged-and-enters-deferred-prosecution-
agreement.
156. See, e.g., JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40991, PRIVATE SECUR-
ITY CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN: LEGAL ISSUES (2010); Rep. of the Working
Group on the Use of Mercenaries As a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the
Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination, Human Rights Council 15th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/15/25 (July 2, 2010), available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UN-
DOC/GEN/G10/151/55/PDF/G1015155.pdf?OpenElement.
157. Jonathan Horlick, Joe Cyr, Scott Reynolds & Andrew Behrman, American and
Canadian Civil Actions Alleging Human Rights Violations Abroad by Oil and Gas Compa-
nies, 45 ALTA. L. REV. 653, 657–58 (2008); see also Note, Corporate Liability for Violations of
International Human Rights Law, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2025 (2001).
158. Regis Bismuth, Mapping a Responsibility of Corporations for Violations of Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law Sailing Between International and Domestic Legal Orders, 38
DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 203, 204 (2010); see also ICRC, BUSINESS AND INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF BUSINESS
ENTERPRISES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 24 (2006); Erik Mose, Corpo-
rate Criminal Liability and the Rwandan Genocide, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 973, 974 (2008).
159. Aomar Ouali & Paul Schemm, Desert Drama: Islamists Take Hostages in Algeria,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 16, 2013), http://hosted2.ap.org/APDEFAULT/3d281c11a96b4ad082
fe88aa0db04305/Article_2013-01-16-Algeria-Kidnapping/id-1b29673dae1745f686acac504f96
c598.
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Many corporations have far greater resources than the states in which
they operate. The search for profit will drive them to protect their assets in
areas where governments cannot control the territory. In many cases, this
territory will be contested and in an area already enflamed by internal
armed conflict. These corporate armies will be tasked with protecting cor-
porate assets, employees, and resources, but will find themselves involved
in the armed conflicts raging about them.
c) Global Criminal Enterprises
Another group that could also be discussed under “Organized Armed
Groups” below is global criminal enterprises, such as the various organ-
ized narcotics organizations operating in Mexico and other parts of Cen-
tral and South America. Reports place the number of armed fighters in
Mexico alone at over 100,000,160 a number much larger than in most re-
cent armed conflicts.
In addition to narcotics organizations, global criminal enterprises are
involved in counterfeiting, money laundering, arms smuggling, and the sex
trade to name just a few.161 Many of these criminal enterprises have links
to armed conflict and even contain factions within their business whose
role is to conduct military-type tasks necessary for the business enterprise.
However, all of these global organizations are likely to appear on future
battlefields in order to conduct their business.
d) State Paramilitaries
The large-scale operation of armed drones by the CIA portends a shift
in the use of paramilitary organizations in the future. While the CIA has,
from its inception, been involved in covert operations that resulted in mili-
tary-type activities, the scale and openness of current operations is qualita-
tively different.162 There is very little difference between the drone strikes
conducted by the U.S. military and those done by the CIA, except perhaps
in their regulation by the LOAC.163
These activities by the United States will likely set an example for
other countries that also have similar agencies and will begin to use them
more openly in similar ways. Future armed conflicts will undoubtedly in-
volve intelligence and other paramilitary agencies operating openly and
using military weapons and tactics.
160. Carina Bergal, The Mexican Drug War: The Case For A Non-International Armed
Conflict Classification, 34 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1042, 1066 (2011).
161. JOHN EVANS, CRIMINAL NETWORKS, CRIMINAL ENTERPRISES 2 (1994) available at
http://www.icclr.law.ubc.ca/publications/reports/netwks94.pdf.
162. See Richard M. Pious, White House Decisionmaking Involving Paramilitary Forces,
J. NAT’L SEC. L & POL’Y (Jan. 24, 2012), http://jnslp.com/2012/01/24/white-house-decision-
making-involving-paramilitary-forces/.
163. See US: Transfer CIA Drone Strikes to Military Ensure Intelligence Agency Abides
by International Law, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Apr. 20, 2012), http://www.hrw.org/news/
2012/04/20/us-transfer-cia-drone-strikes-military.
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c. State Forces
Significant changes will occur in future armed conflict even to recog-
nized state forces. The changing methods of warfare will undermine the
traditional criteria for combatants, and the incorporation of autonomous
weapons into regular armed forces will diminish the role of humans in
targeting decisions.
i. Combatant’s Traditional Criteria
Article 1 of the Annex to Hague Convention (IV) respecting the Laws
and Customs of War on Land states that:
The laws, rights, and duties of war apply not only to armies, but
also to militia and volunteer corps fulfilling the following
conditions:
1. To be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
2. To have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance;
3. To carry arms openly; and
4. To conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and
customs of war.
In countries where militia or volunteer corps constitute the army,
or form part of it, they are included under the denomination
“army.”164
These qualifications for militias are repeated in the GPI.165 Though textu-
ally limited to militias and volunteer corps who are working with a party to
164. Hague Regulations, supra note 111, art. 1.
165. Article 4 states:
Art 4. A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons
belonging to one of the following categories, who have fallen into the power of the
enemy:
(1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as well as members of
militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces.
(2) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including
those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict
and operating in or outside their own territory, even if this territory is occu-
pied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps, including such organized
resistance movements, fulfil the following conditions:
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
(c) that of carrying arms openly;
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of
war.
See Geneva Convention, supra note 18, at art. 4.
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the conflict, the common understanding is that state forces will also meet
these criteria.166 The difficulty with “armed groups” and these criteria has
been alluded to above, but it also exists with traditional state forces.
States (and other organized groups) are employing weapons from
great distances where the uniform of the targeter is indiscernible by the
eventual target. The eventual target of malware launched from the Na-
tional Security Agency in Maryland will be completely unaware of
whether the person who launched the malware was wearing a uniform or
civilian clothes. The development and employment of viruses or genomic
mutators will likely be done far from the active battlefield.
Even if created and employed by uniformed personnel, when the vi-
rus, nanobot, or computer malware reaches its intended target, it will con-
tain no marking that notifies the victim of the identity of the attacker. In
fact, in many of these future weapons systems, anonymity is vital to the
success of the operation. As future technologies develop, the issue of
“having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance [and] . . . carry-
ing arms openly”167 will pressure the LOAC to account for modern armed
conflict practices.
ii. Autonomous Weapon Systems
Autonomous weapons have become a very important discussion in the
area of the law governing future weapons systems. They include robots,
unarmed and armed unmanned aerial and underwater vehicles,168 auto-
response systems such as armed unmanned sentry stations,169 and a host
of other developing weapon systems. The systems will be discussed in
greater detail below as means and methods, but they are raised here be-
cause the more autonomous they become, the more like “actors” they
appear.
166. According to 3 GENEVA CONVENTIONS COMMENTARY, supra note 113, at 52:
The drafters of the 1949 Convention, like those of the Hague Convention, consid-
ered that it was unnecessary to specify the sign which members of armed forces
should have for purposes of recognition. It is the duty of each State to take steps so
that members of its armed forces can be immediately recognized as such and to see
to it that they are easily distinguishable from members of the enemy armed forces
or from civilians. The Convention does not provide for any reciprocal notification
of uniforms or insignia, but merely assumes that such items will be well known and
that there can be no room for doubt.
167. Hague Regulations, supra note 111, art. 1.
168. Damien Gayle, Rise of the Machine: Autonomous Killer Robots ‘Could Be Devel-
oped in 20 Years’, DAILY MAIL (Nov. 20, 2012), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/arti-
cle-2235680/Rise-Machines-Autonomous-killer-robots-developed-20-years.html; Marlin,
LOCKHEED MARTIN, http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/products/marlin.html (last visited
Mar. 9, 2014).
169. Jonathan D. Moreno, Robot Soldiers Will Be a Reality—And a Threat, WALL
STREET J. (May 11, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304203604577396
282717616136.html.
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The military use of robots will sufficiently illustrate the point. It is
clear that the general use of robots in armed conflict is increasing.170 Ac-
cording to Peter Singer, a well-known expert on the issue of robotics and
armed conflict,171 “besides the U.S., there are 43 other nations that are
also building, buying and using military robotics today.”172 Remotely con-
trolled armed robots entered action in Iraq in summer of 2007.173 This is a
trend that will clearly continue. A report that the “Joint Forces Command
drew up in 2005 . . . suggested autonomous robots on the battlefield will be
the norm within 20 years,”174 and a recent report written by the U.S. De-
partment of Defense (DoD), titled Unmanned Systems Integrated
Roadmap FY2011-2036, stated that it “envisions unmanned systems seam-
lessly operating with manned systems while gradually reducing the degree
of human control and decision making required for the unmanned portion
of the force structure.”175
It appears the intent is to increase the autonomy with which these
weapon systems will function, causing Singer to point out that robotics is
“changing not just the ‘how’ [of warfare] but the ‘who.’”176 Future robots
may use “brain-machine interface technologies” or “whole brain emula-
tion.”177 The potentially autonomous nature of robots means that they will
become actors on the battlefield, as well as means and methods of warfare.
Singer describes this dramatically changing advance in robotic tech-
nology as a revolution:
Carrying forward, that means that our [robotic] systems . . . will be
a billion times more powerful than today within 25 years. I’m not
saying a billion in a sort of amorphous, meaningless, Austin-Pow-
ers’ one billion. I mean literally take the power of those systems
and multiply them times 1 with 9 zeros behind it. What that means
is that the kind of things people used to talk about only at science
170. John Markoff, U.S. Aims for Robots to Earn Their Stripes on the Battlefield, INT’L
HERALD TRIBUNE (Nov. 27, 2010), at 1.
171. Singer is currently the director of the 21st Century Security and Intelligence and a
senior fellow in foreign policy at Brookings. He has authored numerous articles and books on
future weapons, with particular emphasis on robotics. See Peter W. Singer, BROOKINGS, http:/
/www.brookings.edu/experts/singerp (last visited Mar. 9, 2014).
172. Steve Kanigher, Author Talks about Military Robotics and the Changing Face of
War, LAS VEGAS SUN (Mar. 17, 2011), http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2011/mar/17/mili-
tary-robotics-and-changing-face-war/.
173. Stew Magnuson, Gun Toting Robots See Action in Iraq, NAT’L DEF. MAG. (Sept.
2007), http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2007/September/Pages/
RifleToting4435.aspx.
174. P.W. Singer, In the Loop? Armed Robots and the Future of War, DEF. INDUSTRY
DAILY (Jan. 28, 2009, 20:09), http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/In-the-Loop-Armed-Ro-
bots-and-the-Future-of-War-05267/.
175. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., UNMANNED SYSTEMS INTEGRATED ROADMAP FY2011-2036,
3 (2011), available at http://www.defenseinnovationmarketplace.mil/resources/Unmanned-
SystemsIntegratedRoadmapFY2011.pdf.
176. Singer, supra note 11, at 10.
177. Moreno, supra note 169.
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fiction conventions like Comic-Con now need to be talked about
by people like us, need to be talked about by people in the halls of
power, need to be talked about in the Pentagon. We are exper-
iencing a robots revolution.178
In response to these advances, the DoD recently issued a Directive
titled “Autonomy in Weapon Systems”179 that applies to the “design, de-
velopment, acquisition, testing, fielding, and employment of autonomous
and semi-autonomous weapon systems, including guided munitions that
can independently select and discriminate targets.”180 The Directive states
that “It is DoD policy that . . . [a]utonomous and semi-autonomous
weapon systems shall be designed to allow commanders and operators to
exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force.”181
In the same week the DoD Directive was issued, Human Rights
Watch issued a report182 calling for a multilateral treaty that would “pro-
hibit the development, production and use of fully autonomous weap-
ons.”183 The Directive and Report have sparked a great deal of
discussion,184 much of which has revolved around the ability of an autono-
mous weapon to make decisions as required by the LOAC.185
178. Singer, supra note 11.
179. Dept. of Def., Directive, 3000.09, Autonomy in Weapon Systems (D.O.D. 2012).
The Directive followed a DoD Defense Science Board Task Force Report on “The Role of
Autonomy in DoD Systems” that was issued in July of 2012. DOD DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD,
THE ROLE OF AUTONOMY IN DOD SYSTEMS (2012), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/
agency/dod/dsb/autonomy.pdf.
180. Dept. of Def., Directive, 3000.09, Autonomy in Weapon Systems ¶ 2a(2), (D.O.D.
2012). The Directive “[d]oes not apply to autonomous and semi-autonomous cyberspace sys-
tems for cyberspace operations; unarmed, unmanned platforms; unguided munitions; muni-
tions manually guided by the operator (e.g. laser- or wire-guided munitions); mines; or
unexploded explosive ordnance.” Id. ¶ 2b.
181. Id. ¶ 4a.
182. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOSING HUMANITY: THE CASE AGAINST KILLER RO-
BOTS (2012), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/arms1112ForUpload_0
_0.pdf.
183. Id. at 46.
184. See, e.g., Kenneth Anderson, Readings: Autonomous Weapon Systems and Their
Regulation, LAWFARE: HARD NAT’L SEC. CHOICES (Dec. 11, 2012, 6:26 PM), http://www
.lawfareblog.com/2012/12/readings-autonomous-weapon-systems-and-their-regulation/; Ken-
neth Anderson, Autonomous Weapon Systems and Their Regulation—A Flurry of Activity,
THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 12, 2012, 9:32 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2012/12/12/au-
tonomous-weapon-systems-and-their-regulation-a-flurry-of-activity/; Jordana Mishory,
Carter: Human Input Required For Autonomous Weapon Systems, UNMANNED SYSTEMS
ALERT (Nov. 28, 2012) http://unmannedsystemsalert.com/Unmanned-Systems-General/Pub-
lic-Content/carter-human-input-required-for-autonomous-weapon-systems/menu-id-1004
.html?S=LI#%21; Michael N. Schmitt, Autonomous Weapon Systems and International Hu-
manitarian Law: A Reply to Critics, HARV. NAT’L. SEC. J. (Feb. 5, 2013), http://harvardnsj
.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Schmitt-Autonomous-Weapon-Systems-and-IHL-Final.pdf.
185. Spencer Ackerman, Pentagon: A Human Will Always Decide When a Robot Kills
You, WIRED (Nov. 26, 2012, 6:12 PM), www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/11/human-robot-
kill.
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Despite the DoD Directive, the international community must recog-
nize that at some point, fully autonomous weapon systems will likely in-
habit the battlefield (and may eventually become the predominant
players) and will be making decisions that we now think of as requiring
human intervention.186 This will stress our current understanding and ap-
plication of the LOAC, and force an evolution in how we apply LOAC
principles.
2. Emerging Law
The section above has touched only briefly on some of the emerging
factors regarding actors on the battlefield that will place stresses on the
LOAC in future armed conflicts. Anticipating these emerging factors, the
law will need to evolve to respond to technological developments and sig-
nal appropriate regulation.
a. Attack
The proscription dealing with civilians is against making them the ob-
ject of “attack.” The meaning of attack is defined in GPI as “acts of vio-
lence against the adversary, whether in offence or in defence.”187 The
strict reading of this treaty language is that civilians are only protected
from acts of violence. As clearly argued by Paul Walker, most cyber activi-
ties will not reach the threshold of an attack,188 meaning they are not pro-
scribed. Cyber (and other) activities that cause mere inconvenience are
legitimate, even when directed at the civilian population.189 This argument
will arise again below under means and methods of warfare because there
are any number of potential or future weapons that will likely fall under
the threshold of an “act of violence.” If so, as a matter of targeting, civil-
ians are not protected from these activities that do not amount to an
attack.
For example, recalling the scenario from the beginning of the article, it
is unclear whether the voluntary ingestion of a pill or even the inhalation
of a nanobot would be considered an attack. Likewise, it is unclear that
infection with a flu-like virus or even a viral gene alteration that had no
effect on an individual would be considered an attack. Therefore, under
the current LOAC, such activities may be permitted.
One might argue that Article 51 of GPI requires that “the civilian
population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against
dangers arising from military operations,”190 and “military operations” is a
category much broader than “attacks.” However, even Article 51 only pro-
186. Anderson & Waxman, supra note 23.
187. Protocol I, supra note 9, at art. 49.1.
188. Paul A. Walker, Rethinking Computer Network “Attack”: Implications for Law and
U.S. Doctrine, 1 NAT’L SEC. L. BRIEF 33 (2011), available at http://digitalcom-
mons.wcl.american.edu/nslb/vol1/iss1/3.
189. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 42.
190. Protocol I, supra note 9, art. 51.1.
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tects civilians against “dangers,” a term that is not clearly defined and
might not include flu-like symptoms. Similarly, Article 57.1 states that “In
the conduct of military operations, constant care shall be taken to spare
the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects.”191 The commentary
defines military operations as “any movements, manoeuvres and other ac-
tivities whatsoever carried out by the armed forces with a view to com-
bat,”192 but does not explain what it means to “spare” the population or
define “constant care.”193
With the future development of weapons that will undoubtedly fit be-
low the attack threshold of “acts of violence,” it will be important to clar-
ify the LOAC as it pertains to targeting of civilians as actors in armed
conflict. If the LOAC is designed to protect civilians from the effects of
armed conflict, more detail is necessary here.
b. Status and Conduct
Targeters justify attacking individuals based on either their status or
their conduct. Combatants are targetable simply based on their status. The
LOAC also allows targeting of members of the military wing or an organ-
ized armed group based on their status as members.194 Almost all others
are targetable based solely on their conduct. In other words, the normal
civilian has to do something to bring himself within the crosshairs of a
targeter. As discussed above, future technologies will cause us to rethink
how we currently understand both status and conduct.
Beginning with civilians, under the current DPH Guidance, it is un-
likely that Samantha in the scenario that begins this article would be
targetable. She is an unknowing facilitator of a uniquely lethal virus. Per-
haps the virus could be targeted with lethal force, effectively amounting to
the targeting of Samantha, but one can imagine a different scenario where
Samantha might, instead of walking to the place where the U.S. President
would be speaking, merely prepare food that was going to be served at a
luncheon or package flowers that were going to be delivered to the White
House. Does she become targetable once she has ingested the virus and
remain targetable for the life of the virus, potentially for the rest of her
life? The current LOAC does not seem to contemplate such a reading.
One could argue that she does not directly participate at any point in her
life (though she carries the virus) until she plans on coming into direct
contact with the President, but the burden on targeters to maintain aware-
ness of her until she decides to take direct part is overly burdensome, par-
191. Id. art. 57.1.
192. INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS
OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 680 (Sandoz et al. eds.,
1987) [hereinafter RED CROSS COMMENTARY].
193. For a discussion on this issue relative to cyber operations, see TALLINN MANUAL,
supra note 42; Eric Talbot Jensen, Cyber Attacks: Proportionality and Precautions in Attack,
89 INT’L L. STUD. 198, 202 (2013).
194. See, e.g., Melzer, supra note 123, at 1036.
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ticularly once she has inadvertently passed the virus to others who now
also presumably carry the threatening virus.
Similar difficulties arise from social networking and transnational
communities of interest. As civilians attach themselves to causes, and then
work through social media to forward that cause, do they become target-
able? For example, are the tens of thousands of individuals targetable who
forward a message trying to garner support for a rebel group? What if they
are seeking information that might help the rebel group attack opposing
forces?
In a variation on the same theme, can a state mobilize its citizens to
accomplish national security goals through social media and not forfeit
their protected status? Chris Ford proposes that the federal government
use social networking methods to involve U.S. citizens “into a nation-wide
program designed to address discrete security issues.”195 Would this make
the citizens targetable?
Similarly with hacktivists, could Georgia have targeted the Russian
hacktivists who were degrading the government’s ability to exercise com-
mand and control of their military forces? Whatever response Georgia
would have contemplated would certainly be bound by the principle of
proportionate response, but even the authority to target the hacktivists is
unclear under the current application of the LOAC.
This prospect of using civilians as unwitting tools is an area where the
LOAC is not fully developed. Many of the answers to these questions are
undoubtedly fact-specific, but the use of these future technologies will
force the international community to reconsider its application of LOAC
immunity.
The same questions exist concerning civilian property. Collin Allan
has highlighted the difficulties of the computer system that has been taken
over remotely and acts as part of the attack but whose owner has not made
any affirmative decision to participate in the attack.196 Perhaps that civil-
ian property is transformed into a military objective, but if so, that would
potentially implicate hundreds of thousands of computers that have been
incorporated into powerful botnets and used for nefarious purposes.197
This status and conduct difficulty will also be magnified as new
“armed” groups, including PSCs, corporate armies, and paramilitaries, be-
come more prominent on the battlefield. Presumably, the Taliban could
target a member of the CIA who was flying an armed drone with the in-
tent of attacking members of the Taliban, based on his conduct. Since the
CIA now has a continuing program of targeting with armed drones, is the
entire CIA (or even the portion who work with the drones) targetable
195. Christopher M. Ford, Twitter, Facebook and Ten Red Balloons: Social Network
Problem Solving and Homeland Security, 7 HOMELAND SECURITY AFF. J. 1, 1–2 (2011),
available at http://www.hsaj.org/?article=7.1.3.
196. Allan, supra note 133, at 78–81.
197. See Pierre Thomas & Jack Cloherty, FBI, Facebook Team Up to Fight ‘Butterfly
Botnet’, ABC NEWS (Dec. 12, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/butterfly-botnet-
targets-11-million-including-computer-users/story?id=17947276.
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based on status, not conduct? Similar analysis would apply to PSCs or cor-
porate armies.
In addition to the question of lawfully targeting corporate armies or
PSCs, there is an issue of how the LOAC should respond to their increas-
ing presence on the battlefield. Many will argue that holding to the current
LOAC, which does not authorize them to participate with any status on
the battlefield, is the right way to proceed. But the realities of future
armed conflict and the prevalence of these actors may lead to a different
conclusion.
And finally, in the area of status and conduct there is the traditional
requirement of marking or wearing a uniform and carrying arms openly.
This is an area that is ripe for LOAC evolution. Both Sean Watts198 and
Rosa Brooks199 have written convincingly, challenging the value of the
traditional requirements that combatants “have a fixed distinctive emblem
recognizable at a distance,” and “carry arms openly”200 as being “de-
tach[ed] from reality.”201 In an age where an ever-increasing number of
weapons are initiated, launched, or activated from a time and place distant
from the victim, wearing uniforms and carrying your weapon openly seems
of little value.202
Does it really matter to the victim if the individual launching the com-
puter malware from his office in Maryland is wearing a uniform or not?
Would it be much more meaningful if the malware itself was “marked” as
coming from the United States? When the President collapses from in-
gesting the virus created in the scenario that begins this Article, would it
do more to protect innocent victims of the armed conflict from the United
States’ retaliation if the virus was somehow marked or if Cap’n Capsid was
wearing a uniform while he took his actions in sending the virus to
Samantha?
Each cruise missile launched by the United States is marked with a
U.S. flag, though it is unlikely that anyone will ever see the flag as it flies
toward its target. But the idea of marking the weapon may set the pattern
for future “over the horizon” or “shoot and forget” weapons. One of the
intents in originally requiring combatants to wear uniforms was to make
clear that the attacker represented a sovereign. Accomplishing this with
viruses, genomics, nanotechnology, and cyber attacks will force the inter-
national community to reexamine the traditional criteria for combatants.
c. “Human” Discretion
Much of the legal consternation over robotics and other autonomous
weapons systems is the discomfort with non-human decision making in
198. Sean Watts, Combatant Status and Computer Network Attack, 50 VA. J. INT’L L.
391 (2010).
199. Brooks, supra note 5.
200. Hague Regulations, supra note 111, art. 1.
201. Watts, supra note 198, at 446.
202. Brooks, supra note 5, at 756–57.
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armed conflict, or the “human-out-of-the-loop” weapons. The Human
Rights Watch Report referenced above categorized autonomous weapons
into three categories:
• HUMAN-IN-THE-LOOP WEAPONS: Robots that can select targets
and deliver force only with a human command;
• HUMAN-ON-THE-LOOP WEAPONS: Robots that can select
targets and deliver force under the oversight of a human opera-
tor who can override the robots’ actions; and
• HUMAN-OUT-OF-THE-LOOP WEAPONS: Robots that are capable
of selecting targets and delivering force without any human in-
put or interaction.203
Currently, it is unclear what having a human “in the loop” actually
means204 and whether it will result in fewer targeting mistakes.205 What
does seem to be clear is that having a human in the loop just makes the
communication link between the robot and human the vulnerability.206
Despite this discomfort with a lack of legal precedent, technology con-
tinues to push forward, attempting to make robots more and more capable
of independent decision making. Dyke Weatherington, DoD Deputy Di-
rector of Unmanned Warfare said, “I don’t see any program going down
that path (yet). There are legal and ethical issues, and I just don’t think
either the department or the technology is ready to do that.”207 Dr. Arkin,
Director of the Mobile Robot Laboratory at Georgia Technical College,
says that robots “will not have the full moral reasoning capabilities of
humans, but I believe robots can—and this is hypothesis—perform better
than humans.”208 There is certainly an argument to be made that a robot
that is not subject to the emotions of the situation, dependence on inaccu-
racies and limitations of human sensory perception, and driven to make
decisions based on frail human survivability will “perform better” and be
less likely to engage an inappropriate target.
203. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 182.
204. Singer, supra note 174.
205. See id.
206. Id.
207. Tara McKelvey, Human Input at an End as Killer Robots do the Thinking, THE
AUSTRALIAN (May 21, 2012) at 1. For a discussion of the ethical issues, see Ken Anderson,
An Ethical Turing Test For Autonomous Artificial Agents, CONCURRING OPS. (Feb. 17, 2012,
11:47 AM), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2012/02/an-ethical-turing-test-for-
autonomous-artificial-agents.html.
208. Gary E. Marchant et al., International Governance of Autonomous Military Ro-
bots, 12 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 272, 279–80 (2011) (listing several reasons why auton-
omous robots may be able to outperform humans under combat conditions including: the
ability to act conservatively, they can be used in a self-sacrificing manner if needed and ap-
propriate without reservation by a commanding officer, and they can be designed without
emotions that cloud their judgment); McKelvey, supra note 207; Cry Havoc, and Let Slip the
Highly Ethical Robots of War, THE AM. PROSPECT (Aug. 9, 2011), http://prospect.org/article/
cry-havoc-and-let-slip-highly-ethical-robots-war.
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Autonomous weapons on the battlefield will increase and the auton-
omy of those weapon systems will also increase, raising serious questions
about how the LOAC can deal with these issues.209 As Jonathan Moreno
has noted, “The various international agreements about weapons and war-
fare do not cover the convergence of neuroscience and robotic
engineering.”210
At what point do we determine that we have sufficiently programmed
a weapon system such that it can legally respond to external information
and stimuli in order to make a lethal decision? If the weapon acts incor-
rectly and unlawfully kills someone, who is responsible? Do we put the
system on trial, its designer, its programmer, the soldier who set it up, or
the commander who determined it could be used in that situation? As Vik
Kanwar writes when reviewing Singer’s Wired for War:
From the point of view of the international lawyer, the concern is
not asymmetry of protection, but rather that one side might be
shielded from legal consequences. For a series of partially coher-
ent reasons, the “human element” is seen as “indispensible”: for
providing judgment, restraint, and ultimately responsibility for
decisions.211
All of these questions, and many more, raise legal issues that are as
yet unresolved but will need to be resolved as technology propels us to-
ward the greater use of autonomous weapons. It is unlikely that the inter-
national community will respond to Human Rights Watch’s call for an
international agreement to ban autonomous weapons. History does not
support that idea.212 Therefore, the international community needs to be-
gin now to think of how the LOAC must evolve to respond.213
C. Means and Methods
“Few weapons in the history of warfare, once created, have gone
unused.”
U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary William J. Lynn III214
The quote above by William Lynn highlights the need to evolve the
LOAC to regulate new technologies. Once developed, weaponized tech-
nologies almost inevitably find their way onto the battlefield. In the few
instances where the technologies have not been used, or at least used in a
209. Anderson & Waxman, supra note 23.
210. Moreno, supra note 169.
211. Vik Kanwar, Review Essay: Post-Human Humanitarian Law: The Law of War in
the Age of Robotic Weapons, 2 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 616, 620 (2011).
212. See Banusiewicz, supra note 10.
213. Anderson and Waxman make this argument very effectively concerning autono-
mous weapons in their article, Law and Ethics for Robot Soldiers. Anderson & Waxman,
supra, note 23.
214. Banusiewicz, supra note 10.
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limited fashion, it has been largely based on legal restrictions.215 The
means and methods discussed below will also require the international
community to consider whether the current LOAC is sufficient to ade-
quately regulate their use, and where not, consider what evolutions to the
LOAC are necessary.
1. Emerging Factors
Weapons technology is always advancing. The means of conducting
hostilities and the methods for employment of those means will continue
to develop at an incredible pace over the next few decades. Many of these
future technologies, some of which are discussed below,216 will spring
from peaceful advances that greatly benefit the world at large, but when
weaponized, create difficult regulatory and response problems.217
a. Means
The means of armed conflict generally refers to the weapon used to
engage a target, whether that weapon is a rifle fired by a fighter, an explo-
sive round fired from an artillery tube, or a bomb dropped from an air-
craft. Research continues to develop weapons that are more lethal, more
accurate, more survivable, and less expensive. Future weapons will de-
velop in response to perceived needs by the military, constrained by the
LOAC. This section is certainly not comprehensive, but will discuss some
215. See, e.g., Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21
U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 (entered into force Mar. 5, 1970); Convention on the Prohibi-
tion of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on
their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, S. Treaty Doc. No.103-21, 1974 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
Chemical Weapons Convention].
216. There is no way to adequately describe even a small number of the new technolo-
gies that will become a common part of future armed conflicts. See Blake & Imburgia, supra
note 33, at 162–63; David Axe, Military Must Prep Now for ‘Mutant’ Future, Researchers
Warn, WIRED (Dec. 31, 2012, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/12/penta-
gon-prepare-mutant-future/; Patrick Lin, Could Human Enhancement Turn Soldiers Into
Weapons That Violate International Law? Yes, THE ATLANTIC, (Jan. 4, 2013), http://www
.theatlantic.com/technology/print/2013/01/could-human-enhancement-turn-soldiers-into-
weapons-that-violate-international-law-yes/266732/; Anna Mulrine, Unmanned Drone At-
tacks and Shape-shifting Robots: War’s Remote-control Future, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR
(Oct. 22, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2011/1022/Unmanned-drone-at-
tacks-and-shape-shifting-robots-War-s-remote-control-future; Noah Schachtman, DARPA’s
Magic Plan: ‘Battlefield Illusions’ To Mess With Enemy Minds, WIRED (Feb. 14, 2012), http://
www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/02/darpa-magic/; Noah Schachtman, Suicide Drones, Mini
Blimps and 3D Printers: Inside the New Army Arsenal, WIRED (Nov. 21, 2012), http://www
.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/11/new-army-arsenal/; Mark Tutton, The Future of War: Far-
out Battle Tech, CNN (Dec. 16, 2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/12/15/tech/innovation/darpa-
future-war/index.html.
217. Hoffman, supra note 144, at 78 (“Both cyber and bio threats are embedded in
great leaps of technological progress that we would not want to give up, enabling rapid com-
munications, dramatic productivity gains, new drugs and vaccines, richer harvests, and more.
But both can also be used to harm and destroy. And both pose a particularly difficult strate-
gic quandary: A hallmark of cyber and bio attacks is their ability to defy deterrence and
elude defenses.”).
Winter 2014] The Future of the Law of Armed Conflict 297
of the new weapons technologies that are being developed or researched
to highlight some of the areas where the LOAC will need to evolve.
i. Drones
Drones are a quickly developing technology, and their use has been
widely documented.218 In addition to the armed drones so often the topic
of discussion in the media,219 the United States is using unmanned, un-
marked turboprop aircraft in places like Africa to “record full-motion
video, track infrared heat patterns, and vacuum up radio and cellphone
signals.”220 Drones are now a component of local law enforcement and the
U.S. Federal Aviation Administration is going to pass laws regulating the
use of domestic airspace for drones,221 in anticipation of a dramatic in-
crease in drone space requests.
As the technology continues to develop, not only would drone capa-
bilities increase, but also drone size will significantly decrease. The United
States is currently designing drones as small as caterpillars and moths that
replicate flight mechanics so they can “hide in plain sight.”222 Eventually,
drones will be measured in terms of nanometers and be capable of travel
through the human body.223
In addition to decreasing the size of drones, the technology to arm
these microscopic drones continues to increase. Through innovative weap-
ons technologies,224 genomics,225 and other miniaturization advances, fu-
ture nanodrones will be lethal and pervasive, amongst the population
generally and continuously transmitting data back to the drone’s control-
lers. Singer describes them as a “game changer” on the level with the
atomic bomb.226
218. Peter Bergen & Katherine Tiedemann, Washington’s Phantom War: The Effects of
the U.S. Drone Program in Pakistan, FOREIGN AFF., July-Aug. 2011, at 12, 13 (2011); see also,
Tony Rock, Yesterday’s Laws, Tomorrow’s Technology: The Laws of War and Unmanned
Warfare, 24 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 39, 42 (2011) (talking about the use of drones and its legal
implications).
219. Bergen & Tiedemann, supra note 218, at 17.
220. Whitlock, supra note 153.
221. Wells C. Bennett, Unmanned at Any Speed: Bringing Drones into Our National
Airspace, BROOKINGS (Dec. 14, 2012), http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2012/12/14-
drones-bennett.
222. Elisabeth Bumiller & Thom Shanker, War Evolves With Drones, Some Tiny as
Bugs, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2011), at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/20/
world/20drones.html?pagewanted=all.
223. See Blake & Imburgia, supra note 33, at 180.
224. Mike Hanlon, Recoilless Technology Provides Killer App for UAVs, GIZMAG
(Dec. 11, 2006), http://www.gizmag.com/go/6590/.
225. See infra Part II.C.1.a.vii.
226. Interview with Peter W. Singer, supra note 47 (“I think the way to think about
[unmanned drones] is they are a game-changer when it comes to both technology, but also
war and the politics that surrounds war. This is an invention that’s on the level of gunpowder
or the computer or the steam engine, the atomic bomb. It’s a game changer.”).
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Technology will also make drones accessible to many more actors than
states. Currently, “for about $1,000, you can build your own version of the
Raven drone.”227 General access to miniaturized drones will soon follow.
Eventually, a disgruntled adversary or disaffected civilian will not need
Samantha to carry the virus to the President, but a microdrone with the
ability to inject the virus into the President’s system.
ii. Cyber
In recent surveys by Foreign Policy, cyber capabilities were viewed as
the most dangerous of emerging capabilities.228 Like drones, cyber opera-
tions have been written about extensively,229 including the new Tallinn
Manual, which gives guidance on the application of LOAC to cyber opera-
tions in armed conflict.230 As mentioned above, many nations are develop-
ing cyber capabilities,231 and some speculate that cyber operations will
become such a part of future conflict that “eventually, the Cyber Force
will need to become a separate military branch because of cyberspace’s
international use as a battlefield that directly affects households, corpora-
tions, universities, governments, military, and critical infrastructures.”232
The increasing prevalence and complexity of cyber weapons is without
dispute. The Stuxnet233 malware “infected about 100,000 computers
worldwide, including more than 60,000 in Iran, more than 10,000 in Indo-
227. Singer, supra note 11.
228. Elizabeth Dickinson, The Future of War, FOREIGN POL’Y, Mar.-Apr. 2011, at 64,
available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/02/22/the_future_of_war (describing
that out of sixty-two top professionals, policymakers, and thinkers in the military world,
twenty-four reported drones and other unmanned technologies to be the most innovative in
the last decade but the highest response for the most dangerous innovation was
cyberwarfare). In the 2012 survey, of seventy-six top professionals, policymakers, and think-
ers in the military world, twenty-four (the majority by ten) thought that cyber operations was
the area where the Chinese were catching up with U.S capabilities the fastest. Margaret Slat-
tery, The Future of War, FOREIGN POL’Y, Mar.-Apr. 2012, at 78, available at http://www
.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/27/The_Future_of_War?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&
page=full.
229. COMPUTER NETWORK ATTACK AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Michael N. Schmitt &
Brian T. O’Donnell, eds., 2002); Eric Talbot Jensen, Unexpected Consequences From Knock-
on Effects: A Different Standard for Computer Network Operations?, 18 AM. U. INT’L L.
REV. 1145 (2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=987553;
Michael N. Schmitt, The Principle of Distinction in 21st Century Warfare, 2 YALE HUM. RTS.
& DEV. L.J. 143 (1999); Watts, supra note 198, at 392; Sean Watts, Cyber Perfidy and the Law
of War (unpublished manuscript)(on file with author).
230. TALLINN MANUAL supra note 42, at 75–202.
231. See supra Part II.A.1.e.
232. Natasha Solce, Comment, The Battlefield of Cyberspace: The Inevitable New Mili-
tary Branch—The Cyber Force, 18 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 293, 318 (2008).
233. See generally Thabet, supra note 78.
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nesia and more than 5,000 in India;”234 the recent Flame malware235 “ex-
ceeds all other known cyber menaces to date” according to Kapersky Lab
and CrySys Lab which discovered the malware.236
One of the great allures of cyber weapons is their bloodless nature,237
but ethicists worry about the impact of that on armed conflict. “With
cyberweapons, a war theoretically could be waged without casualties or
political risk, so their attractiveness is great—maybe so irresistible that
nations are tempted to use them before such aggression is justified.”238
Another aspect of cyber means of armed conflict is its ready access to
non-state actors. Individual hackers have been known to develop sophisti-
cated malware and cause great damage.239 Particularly in cyber opera-
tions, one of the great dangers is reengineering or copycats.240 As
reported by David Hoffman,
Langner [who first discovered the Stuxnet malware] warns that
such malware can proliferate in unexpected ways: “Stuxnet’s at-
tack code, available on the Internet, provides an excellent
blueprint and jump-start for developing a new generation of cyber
warfare weapons.” He added, “Unlike bombs, missiles, and guns,
cyber weapons can be copied. The proliferation of cyber weapons
cannot be controlled. Stuxnet-inspired weapons and weapon tech-
nology will soon be in the hands of rogue nation states, terrorists,
organized crime, and legions of leisure hackers.”241
234. Holger Stark, Stuxnet Virus Opens New Era of Cyber War, SPIEGEL ONLINE INT’L
(Aug. 8, 2011, 3:04 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/mossad-s-miracle-weapon-
stuxnet-virus-opens-new-era-of-cyber-war-a-778912.html. Admittedly, Stuxnet was governed
by the jus ad bellum, but similar malware will undoubtedly be used during armed conflict in
the future. For an analysis of Stuxnet under the jus in bello, see Jeremy Richmond, Evolving
Battlefields: Does Stuxnet Demonstrate a Need for Modifications to the Law of Armed Con-
flict?, 35 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 842 (2012).
235. See generally Full Analysis of Flame’s Command and Control Servers, supra note
79.
236. Flame Virus Update: UK Servers Used to Control Malware, INT’L BUS. TIMES NEWS
(June 6, 2012, 1:10 PM), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/articles/349195/20120606/flame-update-
servers-shut-down.htm.
237. Blake & Imburgia, supra note 33, at 181–83.
238. Patrick Lin, Fritz Allhoff & Neil Rowe, Is it Possible to Wage a Just Cyberwar?,
THE ATLANTIC (June 5, 2012, 11:24 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/
2012/06/is-it-possible-to-wage-a-just-cyberwar/258106/.
239. David Kleinbard & Richard Richtmyer, U.S. Catches ‘Love’ Virus: Quickly
Spreading Virus Disables Multimedia Files, Spawns Copycats, CNNMONEY (May 5, 2000,
11:33 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2000/05/05/technology/loveyou/.
240. Mark Clayton, From the Man Who Discovered Stuxnet, Dire Warnings One Year
Later, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Sept. 22, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2011/0922/
From-the-man-who-discovered-Stuxnet-dire-warnings-one-year-later.
241. Hoffman, supra note 144.
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iii. Robots
Again, the use of robots has been well documented, along with many
of the issues they create.242 Though the use of robotics has not progressed
as far as that of drones and cyber operations, their use is increasing in
armed conflict. As noted by Singer,
When the U.S. military went into Iraq in 2003, it had only a hand-
ful of robotic planes, commonly called “drones” but more accu-
rately known as “unmanned aerial systems.” Today, we have more
than 7,000 of these systems in the air, ranging from 48-foot-long
Predators to micro-aerial vehicles that a single soldier can carry in
a backpack. The invasion force used zero “unmanned ground ve-
hicles,” but now we have more than 12,000, such as the lawn-
mower-size Packbot and Talon, which help find and defuse deadly
roadside bombs.243
Singer further argues that “literally thousands of Americans are alive to-
day because of [ground and air robotic systems]. They offer precision on
the battlefield never imagined before, as well as remove many dangers to
our forces.”244
Robots will be used for both lethal and less than lethal operations.
Bobby Chesney speculates on the potential use of robots in capturing as
opposed to killing enemies on the battlefield. He admits this possibility is
“far-fetched” now, but says he “would not be surprised to learn that a
robotic descent/secure/ascent technology already is in development.”245
Retired Army Colonel Thomas Adams argues that “Future Robotic
weapons ‘will be too fast, too small, too numerous and will create an envi-
ronment too complex for humans to direct.’ . . . Innovations with robots
‘are rapidly taking us to a place where we may not want to go, but proba-
bly are unable to avoid.’”246 Testing and development continue247 as ro-
bots take a more active role in hostilities.
242. See generally PETER W. SINGER, WIRED FOR WAR (2009).
243. P. W. Singer, We. Robot, SLATE (May 19, 2010), http://www.slate.com/articles/
news_and_politics/war_stories/2010/05/we_robot.html; see also Bumiller & Shanker, supra
note 222.
244. Steve Kanigher, Author Talks About Military Robotics and the Changing Face of
War, LAS VEGAS SUN (Mar. 17, 2011, 2:01 AM), http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2011/mar/
17/military-robotics-and-changing-face-war/ (quoting Singer).
245. Robert Chesney, Robot Rendition: Will There One Day Be Machines That Capture
Rather Than Kill?, LAWFARE: HARD NAT’L SEC. CHOICES (Aug. 10, 2012, 5:41 PM), http://
www.lawfareblog.com/2012/08/robot-rendition-will-there-one-day-be-machines-that-capture-
rather-than-kill/.
246. Robots on Battlefield: Robotic Weapons Might be the Way of the Future, But They
Raise Ethical Questions About the Nature of Warfare, TOWNSVILLE BULL. (Austr.), Sept. 18,
2009, at 210.
247. Peter Finn, A Future for Drones: Automated Killing, WASH. POST (Sept. 19, 2011),
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-09-19/national/35273383_1_drones-human-target-
military-base.
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iv. Nanotechnology
Nanotechnology is “the understanding and control of matter at the
nanoscale, at dimensions between approximately 1 and 100 nanometers,
where unique phenomena enable novel applications.”248 As stated by
Lieutenant Commander Thomas Vandermolen, “Nanoscience is in its in-
fancy” and its “true practical potential is still being discovered.”249 It has
already “exploded from a relatively obscure and narrow technical field to
a scientific, economic and public phenomenon.”250
The United States has embraced nanotechnology development. The
National Nanotechnology Initiative is a federal interagency activity that
was established in 2000. It is managed by the National Science and Tech-
nology Council and its goal is to “expedite[ ] the discovery, development
and deployment of nanoscale science and technology to serve the public
good, through a program of coordinated research and development al-
igned with the missions of the participating agencies.”251 Nanotechnology
has already yielded amazing results252 including “a nanoparticle that has
shown 100 percent effectiveness in eradicating the hepatitis C virus in lab-
oratory testing.”253
Because of its potential and its infancy, the U.S. Government has
passed legislation concerning nanotechnology, creating a National Na-
notechnology Program (NNP) and a National Nanotechnology Coordina-
tion Office (NNCO).254 The responsibilities of the NNCO are to
(1) establish the goals, priorities, and metrics for evaluation for
federal nanotechnology research, development, and other
activities;
248. Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L NANOTECHNOLOGY INITIATIVE, http://nano
.gov/nanotech-101/nanotechnology-facts (last visited Mar. 9, 2014).
249. Thomas D. Vandermolen, Molecular Nanotechnology and National Security, AIR &
SPACE POWER J. (Fall 2006), http://www.au.af.mil/au/cadre/aspj/airchronicles/apj/apj06/fal06/
vandermolen.html.
250. Kenneth W. Abbot, Douglas S. Sylvester & Gary E. Marchant, Transnational Reg-
ulation of Nanotechnology: Reality or Romanticism?, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON
REGULATING NANOTECHNOLOGIES (Edward Elgar ed. 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1424697.
251. NNI Vision, Goals, and Objectives, NAT’L NANOTECHNOLOGY INITIATIVE, http://
www.nano.gov/about-nni/what/vision-goals (last visited Mar. 9, 2014).
252. See David Brown, Making Steam Without Boiling Water, Thanks to Nanoparticles,
WASH. POST (Nov. 19, 2012), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-11-19/national/
35505658_1_steam-nanoparticles-water.
253. Dexter Johnson, Nanoparticle Completely Eradicates Hepatitis C Virus, SPECTRUM
(July 17, 2012), http://spectrum.ieee.org/nanoclast/semiconductors/nanotechnology/nanoparti
cle-completely-eradicates-hepatitis-c-virus?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&
utm_campaign=Feed%3A+IeeeSpectrumSemiconductors+%28IEEE+Spectrum%3A+Semi
conductors%29; accord “Nanorobot” Can be Programmed to Target Different Diseases, PHYS
.ORG (July 16, 2012), http://phys.org/news/2012-07-nanorobot-diseases.html.
254. 15 U.S.C. § 7501 (2006).
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(2) invest in federal research and development programs in na-
notechnology and related sciences to achieve those goals; and
(3) provide for interagency coordination of federal na-
notechnology research, development, and other activities un-
dertaken pursuant to the Program.255
The legislation does not mention military uses of nanotechnology, but it
does task the NNP with “ensuring that ethical, legal, environmental, and
other appropriate societal concerns, including the potential use of na-
notechnology in enhancing human intelligence and in developing artificial
intelligence which exceeds human capacity, are considered during the de-
velopment of nanotechnology.”256
Nanotechnology research is booming. The U.S. Government Account-
ability Office reports that:
From fiscal years 2006 to 2010, the National Science and Technol-
ogy Council reported more than a doubling of National Na-
notechnology Initiative member agencies’ funding for
nanotechnology environmental, health, and safety (EHS) re-
search—from approximately $38 million to $90 million. Reported
EHS research funding also rose as a percentage of total na-
255. 15 U.S.C. § 7501(a) (2006).
256. 15 U.S.C. § 7501(b)(10) (2006). In response to concerns about the ethics of na-
notechnology, the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, in its report of
April 2008 on nanotechnology, concluded:
[T]here are no ethical concerns that are unique to nanotechnology today. That is
not to say that nanotechnology does not warrant careful ethical evaluation. As
with all new science and technology development, all stakeholders have a shared
responsibility to carefully evaluate the ethical, legal, and societal implications
raised by novel science and technology developments. However, the[re is] . . . no
apparent need at this time to reinvent fundamental ethical principles or fields, or
to develop novel approaches to assessing societal impacts with respect to
nanotechnology.
PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., NATIONAL NANOTECHNOLOGY INITI-
ATIVE: SECOND ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NNAP (2008), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST-NNAP-NNI-Assess-
ment-2008.pdf. Marchant, et al. have written:
More recently, codes of conduct have emerged at the forefront of discussions to
restrict the use of genetic engineering to create new biological weapons. Although
there are concerns that unenforceable codes of conduct will not provide strong
enough assurances against the creation of new genetically engineered biological
weapons, they may play an important bridging role in providing some initial pro-
tection and governance until more formal legal instruments can be negotiated and
implemented. In the same way, codes of conduct may play a similar transitional
role in establishing agreed-upon principles for the military use of robots.
Gary E. Marchant et al., International Governance of Autonomous Military Robots, 12
COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 272, 307 (2011).
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notechnology funding over the same period, ending at about 5
percent in 2010.257
In addition to the United States, countries like China and Russia are
also “openly investing significant amounts of money in
nanotechnology.”258
The potential benefits of nanotechnology for military purposes have
quickly become apparent. As early as 2006, Forbes reported:
The Department of Defense has spent over $1.2 billion on na-
notechnology research through the National Nanotech Initiative
since 2001. The DOD believed in nano long before the term was
mainstream. According to Lux Research, the DOD has given
grants totaling $195 million to 809 nanotech-based companies
starting as early as 1988. Over the past ten years, the number of
nanotech grants has increased tenfold.259
Blake and Imburgia believe that nanotechnology will have a profound
effect on both means and methods of warfare:
Scientists believe nanotechnology can be used to develop con-
trolled and discriminate biological and nerve agents; invisible, in-
telligence gathering devices that can be used for covert activities
almost anywhere in the world; and artificial viruses that can enter
into the human body without the individual’s knowledge. So
called “nanoweapons” have the potential to create more intense
laser technologies as well as self-guiding bullets that can direct
themselves to a target based on artificial intelligence. Some ex-
perts also believe nanotechnology possesses the potential to at-
tack buildings as a “swarm of nanoscale robots programmed only
to disrupt the electrical and chemical systems in a building,” thus
avoiding the collateral damage a kinetic strike on that same build-
ing would cause.260
Nanotechnology also has the:
potential to drastically enhance military operations and safety as
well as homeland security. Advances in lightweight, nanoscale-en-
gineered materials will protect soldiers on the battlefield from
bullets and shrapnel while giving them extreme mobility. In case
of injury, engineered bandages with embedded antimicrobial na-
257. US Government Accountability Office Releases Report on Nanotechnology EHS
Research Performance, NANOWERK NEWS (June 22, 2012), http://www.nanowerk.com/news2/
newsid=25691.php.
258. Blake & Imburgia, supra note 33, at 180.
259. Josh Wolfe & Dan van den Bergh, Nanotech Takes on Homeland Terror, FORBES
(Aug. 14, 2006, 6:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/2006/08/11/nanotech-terror-cepheid-home-
land-in_jw_0811soapbox_inl.html.
260. Blake & Imburgia, supra note 33, at 180 (citations omitted).
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noparticles will stop deep bleeding in a matter of minutes and
keep the wound free from infection.261
Recently, French scientists “report[ed] the first attempt to control the
combustion and the detonation properties of a high explosive through its
structure.”262
Nanotechnology is likely to improve the strength and longevity of ma-
chinery,263 advance stealth technology,264 allow the creation of more pow-
erful and efficient bombs,265 and result in miniature nuclear weapons.266 It
will eventually allow for the creation of microscopic nanobots that can be
controlled and used as sensors to gather information or as weapons to
carry lethal toxins or genomic alterers into the bodies of humans.267
Nanotechnology is a development with almost unlimited applications
to future armed conflict. It will make weapons smaller, more mobile, and
more potent. It will provide easier, quicker, and more accurate means of
collecting information. It will allow greater range, effect, and lethality. For
actors with the technology, it has the potential to completely change
armed conflict as we know it.
v. Directed Energy
Directed energy weapons include lasers of various magnitude, micro-
wave and millimeter-wave weapons. These weapon systems are based on
relatively new technology and almost all are still in the early stages of
development. Despite this, in a report by the U.S. Defense Science Board
dealing with directed energy,268 the co-chairs lament the lack of focus on
what they term a “transformational ‘game changer’.”269 Though the DoD
261. Wolfe & van den Bergh, supra note 259.
262. Military Nanotechnology: High Precision Explosives Through Nanoscale Structur-
ing, NANOWERK NEWS (June 5, 2008), http://www.nanowerk.com/spotlight/spotid=5956.php.
263. Benefits and Applications, NAT’L NANOTECHNOLOGY INITIATIVE, http://nano.gov/
you/nanotechnology-benefits (last visited Mar. 9, 2014).
264. Clay Dillow, Carbon Nanotube Stealth Paint Could Make Any Object Ultra-Black,
POPSCI (Dec. 6, 2011, 12:15 PM), http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2011-12/paint-im-
bued-carbon-nanotubes-could-make-any-object-absorb-broad-spectrum-light.
265. Adrian Blomfield, Russian Army ‘Tests the Father of All Bombs’, TELEGRAPH
(Sept. 12, 2007, 12:01 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1562936/Russian-
army-tests-the-father-of-all-bombs.html.
266. Military Uses of Nanotechnology: The Future of War, THENANOAGE.COM, http://
www.thenanoage.com/military.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2014).
267. Scientists and the University of California, Berkeley, are already working on the
Micromechanical Flying Insect Project. Micromechanical Flying Insect, U. CAL. BERKELEY,
http://robotics.eecs.berkeley.edu/~ronf/mfi.html/index.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2014); Na-
notech Weaponry, CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE NANOTECHNOLOGY (Feb. 12, 2004), http://www
.crnano.typepad.com/crnblog/2004/02/nanotech_weapon.html; Caroline Perry, Mass-Produc-
tion Sends Robot Insects Flying, LIVE SCI. (Apr. 18, 2012, 5:51 PM), http://www.livescience
.com/19773-mini-robot-production-nsf-ria.html.
268. DEF. SCI. BD. TASK FORCE, DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS (2007), available at
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ADA476320.pdf.
269. Id. at vii.
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is working on a number of potential systems, “years of investment have
not resulted in any currently high-operational laser capability.”270 There
are a number of functioning systems such as the Airborne Laser and the
Advanced Tactical Laser,271 but these systems have not proven to be ef-
fective battlefield weapons to this point,272 though the Navy recently shot
down a drone with ship-mounted laser.273
Despite these recent setbacks, directed energy weapons of various
types are likely to be deployed in future armed conflicts. They will be used
as maritime, airborne, land-based, and space-based systems. They will be
used both as lethal and non-lethal variants.274
vi. Biological Agents
Biological agents have rarely appeared in armed conflict since the
early twentieth century.275 However, “[s]ince 2001, senior members of
both the Obama and Bush administrations, who have reviewed classified
intelligence, have consistently placed biodefense at or near the top of the
national-security agenda.”276 A 2008 report on the use of weapons of mass
destruction, including biological agents, believes that “a weapon of mass
destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by
the end of 2013” and that “terrorists are more likely to be able to obtain
and use a biological weapon than a nuclear weapon.”277  Though such an
attack has not materialized, the concern about such capability is still valid
as evidenced by the fact that the FBI has recently established a Biological
Countermeasures Unit that monitors the growing Do-It-Yourself Biology
270. Id.
271. Blake & Imburgia, supra note 33, at 177.
272. DEF. SCI. BD. TASK FORCE, supra note 268, at 21–29.
273. Spencer Ackerman, Watch the Navy’s New Ship-Mounted Laser Shoot Cannon Kill
a Drone, WIRED (Apr. 8, 2013), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2013/04/laser-warfare-
system/.
274. See generally DEF. SCI. BD. TASK FORCE, supra note 268; Fritz Allhof, Why Does
International Law Restrict Nonlethal Weapons More Than Deadly Ones?, SLATE (Nov. 13,
2012), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2012/11/nonlethal_weapons_and
_the_law_of_war.html.
275. 137 nations are parties to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiat-
ing, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26
U.S.T. 571, 94 L.N.T.S. 65 [hereinafter Gas Protocol], and the Convention on the Prohibition
of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin
Weapons and on their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583, T.I.A.S. No. 8062; see Stefan
Riedel, Biological Warfare and Bioterrorism: A Historical Review, 17 BAYLOR U. MED.
CENTER PROCEEDINGS 400 (2004).
276. Wil S. Hylton, How Ready are We for Bioterrorism?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/30/magazine/how-ready-are-we-for-bioterrorism
.html?pagewanted=all.
277. BOB GRAHAM ET AL., WORLD AT RISK: THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE
PREVENTION OF WMD PROLIFERATION AND TERRORISM, xv (2008), available at http://www
.absa.org/leg/WorldAtRisk.pdf.
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(DIYbio) movement.278 The general consensus is that although the United
States has made progress in its biodefenses, we are far from being ade-
quately prepared.279
Recent advances in laboratory technology have allowed access to
these horrific weapons to a much more general audience. Brett Giroir,
former Director at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) argues that
[w]hat took me three weeks in a sophisticated laboratory in a top-
tier medical school 20 years ago, with millions of dollars in equip-
ment, can essentially be done by a relatively unsophisticated tech-
nician. . . . A person at a graduate-school level has all the tools
and technologies to implement a sophisticated program to create
a bioweapon.280
Michael Daly writes that “there is already information in public databases
that could be used to generate highly pathogenic biological warfare
agents,”281 and “biohacker communities have popped up around the
globe, with hundreds of do-it-yourself biologists testing their experimental
prowess.”282
In addition to increased access, the methods of contamination make
biological agents catastrophically dangerous. As Wil Hylton argues,
The specter of a biological attack is difficult for almost anyone to
imagine. It makes of the most mundane object, death: a doorknob,
a handshake, a breath can become poison. Like a nuclear bomb,
the biological weapon threatens such a spectacle of horror—skin
boiling with smallpox pustules, eyes blackened with anthrax le-
sions, the rotting bodies of bubonic plagues—that it can seem the
province of fantasy or nightmare or, worse, political
manipulation.283
278. See Todd Kuiken, DIYbio: Low Risk, High Potential, THE SCIENTIST (Mar. 1,
2013), http://www.the-scientist.com/?articles.view/articleNo/34443/title/DIYbio—Low-Risk—
High-Potential/; On Guard Against WMD, FBI (Feb. 21, 2012), http://www.fbi.gov/news/sto-
ries/2012/february/wmd_022112.




281. Michael J. Daly, The Emerging Impact of Genomics on the Development of Biolog-
ical Weapons: Threats and Benefits Posed by Engineered Extremophiles, 21 CLINICS IN LABO-
RATORY MED. 620, 621 (2001), available at http://www.usuhs.mil/pat/deinococcus/FrontPage_
DR_Web_work/Pages/Lab_info/Daly_papers/clinicsLabMedicineVol21No3.pdf.
282. Hanno Charisius et al., Becoming Biohackers: Learning the Game, BBC FUTURE
(Jan. 22, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20130122-how-we-became-biohackers-part-
1.
283. Hylton, supra note 276.
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In combination with advances in nanotechnology, biological agents be-
come even more deadly. As Immanuel has written, “the application of na-
nobiotechnology for engineering biological weapons opens pathways for
an entirely new class of biology based nanoweapons. They could be self-
replication or non-replicating, remotely operable and extremely
destructive.”284
Biological agents also pose some unique problems for deterrence and
interdiction. Graham Allison, the founding Dean of Harvard’s John F.
Kennedy School of Government and a leading expert on nuclear prolifera-
tion, argues that biological terrorism presents some problems even more
difficult than nuclear terrorism:
Nuclear terrorism is a preventable catastrophe, and the reason it’s
preventable is because the material to make a nuclear bomb can’t
be made by terrorists. But in the bio case—oh, my God! Can I
prevent terrorists from getting into their hands anthrax or other
pathogens? No! Even our best efforts can’t do that. I think the
amazing thing is that one hasn’t seen more bioterrorism, given the
relative ease of making a bioweapon and the relative difficulty of
defending.285
The combination of increasing accessibility, the difficulty of detection
and interdiction, and the potentially catastrophic nature of biological
weapons makes them a very appealing weapon for not only terrorists, but
also for nation-states. Despite current legal prohibitions, biological weap-
ons will remain a possible (and likely) weapon in armed conflict.
vii. Genomics
Genomics is the “study of genes and their function.”286 The rapid ad-
vances in genomics287 have had a multitude of benefits for modern
medicine and science in general. The costs are rapidly decreasing and ac-
cessibility rapidly increasing.
A couple of decades ago, it took three years to learn how to clone
and sequence a gene, and you earned a PhD in the process. Now,
thanks to ready-made kits you can do the same in less than three
days . . . [T]he cost of sequencing DNA has plummeted, from
284. Gifty Immanuel, Biotechnology by Bioterrorism: Implications for Clinical
Medicine, Biotechnology, 12 BIOTECHNOLOGY 1, 4 (2007), available at http://www.eolss.net/
Sample-Chapters/C17/E6-58-11-18.pdf.
285. Hylton, supra note 276 (quoting Graham Allison).
286. Definition of Genomics, MEDICINENET.COM, http://www.medterms.com/script/
main/art.asp?articlekey=23242 (last visited Mar. 9, 2014).
287. Hoffman, supra note 144, at 78 (“One thing is certain: The technology for probing
and manipulating life at the genetic level is accelerating. . . . But the inquiry itself highlighted
the rapid pace of change in manipulating biology. Will rogue scientists eventually learn how
to use the same techniques for evil?”).
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about $100,000 for reading a million letters, or base pairs, of DNA
code in 2001, to around 10 cents today.288
However, calls for controls on genetic research and development are
increasing.289
Some scientists and concerned advocates argue for caution and re-
straint because “vulnerability arises from the relative ease with which this
digital genetic code can be accessed, translated, and incorporated into con-
ventional genetic technologies.”290 Machi and McNeill state that:
In today’s market it costs just a few thousand dollars to design a
custom DNA sequence, order it from a manufacturer, and within
a few weeks receive the DNA in the mail. Since select agents are
currently not defined by their DNA sequences, terrorists can actu-
ally order subsets of select agent DNA and assemble them to cre-
ate entire pathogens.291
They similarly estimate that “by 2020 malefactors will have the ability to
manipulate genomes in order to engineer new bioterrorism weapons.”292
The range of nefarious possibilities through the use of genes is very
broad. As proposed at the beginning of this article, stealth viruses could be
introduced covertly through agricultural infestation or nanobots into the
genomes of a given population, and then triggered later by a signal.293
“Bionanobots might be designed that, when ingested from the air by
humans, would assay DNA codes and self-destruct in an appropriate place
(probably the brain) in those persons whose codes had been program-
288. Charisius et al., supra note 282.
289. See Brian Vastag, Environmental Groups Call for Tighter Regulation of ‘Extreme
Genetic Engineering,’ WASH. POST (Mar. 13, 2012), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-
03-13/national/35447443_1_synthetic-biology-environmental-groups-synthetic-organisms.
290. Daly, supra note 281, at 620; see also Anthony C. Littrell, Biological Weapons of
Mass Destruction: The Present and Future Threat, CONFRONTING TERRORISM, 2002, at 339,
available at http://digitalcorpora.org/corp/nps/files/govdocs1/065/065912.pdf; Melinda Willis,
Dangers of Genetically Engineered Weapons, ABC NEWS (Oct. 5, 2011), http://abcnews.go
.com/Health/story?id=117204&page=1#.T-3ze44zzbx.
291. Ethel Machi & Jena Baker McNeil, New Technologies, Future Weapons: Gene Se-
quencing and Synthetic Biology, HOMELAND SECURITY 2020, at 1 (Aug. 24 2010), available at
http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2010/pdf/wm2986.pdf.
292. Id.; according to Paul Hansen’s review, Jeffery Lockwood’s book, Six-Legged
Soldiers, describes how insects have been used in war over the last 100,000 years and suggests
some possibilities for genomics and insects in the future. Paul Hansen, Six-Legged Soldiers:
Using Insects as Weapons of War by Jeffery A. Lockwood, 13 J. MILITARY & STRATEGIC
STUD. 140 (2009), available at http://jmss.org/jmss/index.php/jmss/article/viewFile/375/395.
Lockwood also details “the possibility of future human-made genomic infused mosquito
weapons in North America,” specifically “the potential of insects to be used in future con-
flicts; terrorist attacks with crop destroying beetles, fireflies as natural guardians against bio-
logical attack, or cyborgs used for bomb detection based on the body of a cockroach as the
ultimate indestructible and mobile platform.” Id.
293. Mae-Wan Ho, GM & Bio-Weapons in the Post-Genomics Era, INSTITUTE OF SCI-
ENCE IN SOCIETY (Apr. 30, 2002), http://www.i-sis.org.uk/gmbiopost.php.
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med.”294 The genomic material could be designed to cause a wide array of
results “including death, incapacitation, [and] neurological
impairment.”295
Some domestic legal restrictions are beginning to appear.296 But the
field of genomics and its potential weaponization is still new and difficult
to accurately project or regulate. Even with this limited amount of infor-
mation, it raises some important impacts on the LOAC that will be dis-
cussed below.
b. Methods
The method of targeting is most often a matter of tactics where the
commander decides how and when to employ a weapon system. Com-
manders and individuals must not only concern themselves with the
weapon they are using, but also with the way in which they are using it.
Advancing technology allows weapons to be employed in creative ways
that raise interesting legal issues.
i. Latent Attacks
Perhaps one of the most feared methods of attack is the latent attack.
This type of attack is characterized by the placing or embedding of some
weapon in a place or position where it will not be triggered until signaled
sometime in the future or activated by some future action. Some latent
attacks may even be triggered by the victim himself. As mentioned above
in relation to genomics and biological weapons, latent attacks are a fertile
area for development of stealth viruses and similar weapons. “The concept
of a stealth virus is a cryptic viral infection that covertly enters human cells
(genomes) and then remains dormant for an extended time. However, a
signal by an external stimulus could later trigger the virus to activate and
cause disease.”297 The unique aspect of this is that the viral genetic mate-
rial might be implanted into the victim far in advance by a nanobot and
potentially never activated or only activated upon some signal by the at-
tacker or some other event, either triggered by an unknowing third party
or the victim himself.
294. John L. Petersen & Dennis M. Egan, Small Security: Nanotechnology and Future
Defense, 8 DEF. HORIZONS, Mar. 2002, at 1, 3, available at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/
DIME/documents/DH08.pdf.
295. Neil Davison, Biochemical Weapons: Lethality, Technology, Development, and
Policy, BRADFORD NON-LETHAL WEAPONS RESEARCH PROJECTS (May 8, 2004), http://www
.brad.ac.uk/acad/nlw/research_reports/docs/biochemical_weapons_May04.pdf (quoting J.
Petro, et al., Biotechnology: Impact on Biological Warfare and Biodefense, 1 BIOSECURITY
AND BIOTERRORISM: BIODEFENSE STRATEGY, PRACTICE, AND SCIENCE 161, 168 (2003)).
296. Charisius et al., supra note 282.
297. Michael J. Ainscough, Next Generation Bioweapons: Genetic Engineering and Bio-
logical Warfare, in THE GATHERING BIOLOGICAL WARFARE STORM 165, 176–77, 180 (Barry
R. Schneider & Jim A. Davis eds., 2002), available at http://www.bibliotecapleyades.net/
ciencia/ciencia_virus08.htm.
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The method of implanting the attack far in advance of its likely use is
not unique to biological agents and genomics. Latent computer attacks
have already caused concern298 and continue to grow in appeal. Consider
the manufacture of computer components. It is certainly possible that
manufacturers of computer materials could embed source code in the
hardware of computer components that would trigger certain functions or
operations by that computer at a future time.299 Similarly, consider weap-
ons or military equipment sales. As countries sell military hardware to
other countries, it is entirely possible that latent code has been implanted
that might affect its future function. For example, the United States sells
F-16 aircraft to numerous countries around the world. It seems not only
plausible, but perhaps irresponsible to not implant in the computer func-
tions of that aircraft some computer code that will not allow the F-16 to
engage aircraft that it identifies as belonging to the United States.
The ability to perform latent attacks and keep them hidden until the
appropriate time is a technological question, but it seems unlikely that if
the potential for such actions exists, it would not be used extensively, even
against current allies, as a hedge against changing political landscapes and
alliances.
ii. Camouflage
It is clear that camouflaging soldiers or military equipment is a legiti-
mate ruse of war and raises no LOAC issues generally.300 However, future
developments will allow camouflage in a different way than used before.
Prior uses of camouflage included both blending in with the natural envi-
ronment and mimicking other environments.301 For example, dressing in a
camouflaged uniform allowed soldiers to blend into their environment, but
the nature of the uniform was known to opposing forces. Painting vehicles
to match the anticipated terrain did not change the form of the vehicle.
New technologies will use electronic sensors to “project images of the
surrounding environment back onto the outside of the vehicle enabling it
to merge into the landscape and evade attack.”302 Use of this type of cam-
ouflage in cities or urban environments might actually project a tank to be
a civilian object such as a car. Similar technology is being developed for
individuals as well.303
298. Steve Stecklow, U.S. Nuclear Lab Removes Chinese Tech Over Security Fears,
REUTERS (Jan. 7, 2013, 3:32 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/07/us-huawei-
alamos-idUSBRE90608B20130107.
299. Wary of Naked Force, Israel Eyes Cyberwar on Iran, REUTERS, (Jul. 7, 2009), http:/
/www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3742960,00.html.
300. Sean Watts, Law-of-War Perfidy, on file with author.
301. Id.
302. Sean Rayment, Invisible Tanks Could Be On Battlefield Within Five Years, TELE-
GRAPH (Jan. 9, 2011, 9:30 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/8247967/In-
visible-tanks-could-be-on-battlefield-within-five-years.html.
303. See, e.g., Charley Cameron, Quantum Stealth Camouflage is a Hi-Tech Invisibility
Cloak, INHABITAT (Dec. 22, 2012), http://inhabitat.com/quantum-stealth-camouflage-is-a-hi-
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Other forms of “camouflage” for modern weapons might include hid-
ing specific computers or information through making it appear to be
something else,304 or piggybacking harmful malware or biological or ge-
netic agents on useful or benign agents. These types of methods of attack,
though not new in theory, will be much more prevalent because of the
nature of new technologies and weapons in future armed conflict.
2. Emerging Law
Technologically advanced means and methods of warfare will change
the way armed conflict occurs. As David Ignatius comments,
The ‘laws of war’ may sound like an antiquated concept in this age
of robo-weapons. But, in truth, a clear international legal regime
has never been more needed: It is a fact of modern life that people
in conflict zones live in the perpetual cross hairs of deadly weap-
ons. Rules are needed for targets and targeters alike.305
The LOAC must respond by evolving in several specific but fundamental
areas. The section below will outline some of the areas where adaptation is
most needed.
a. Attack
As discussed above,306 the LOAC provisions apply most completely
and forcefully only to actions that are deemed an “attack.” The meaning
of attack is defined in GPI as “acts of violence against the adversary,
whether in offence or in defence.”307 Many operations conducted with
new technologies will not reach the threshold of an attack, meaning they
are not proscribed. This has already been discussed with reference to cyber
operations, but it equally applies to the other means and methods dis-
tech-invisibility-cloak/; Damien Gayle, The Camouflage Fabric ‘That Can Make Soldiers IN-
VISIBLE’, DAILY MAIL (Dec. 10, 2012), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-
2245935/The-camouflage-fabric-make-soldiers-INVISIBLE-Company-claims-Pentagon-
backing-miracle-material.html.
304. Eric Talbot Jensen, Cyber Deterrence, 26 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 773 (2012).
305. Gary Marchant et al., Nanotechnology Regulation: The United States Approach, in
NEW GLOBAL FRONTIERS IN REGULATION: THE AGE OF NANOTECHNOLOGY 189 (Graeme
Hodge et al. eds., 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1305
256; Kenneth W. Abbot et al., supra note 245; Kenneth W. Abbott, et al., A Framework
Convention for Nanotechnology, 36 ENVTL. L. REP. 10931 (2006), available at http://papers
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=946777; Gary E. Marchant et al., A New Soft Law Ap-
proach to Nanotechnology Oversight: A Voluntary Product Certification Scheme, UCLA J.
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y (forthcoming), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abs
tract_id=1483910; Gary E. Marchant et al., Risk Management Principles for Nanotechnology,
2 NANOETHICS 43 (2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=102
0104; David Ignatius, Dazzling New Weapons Require New Rules for War, WASH. POST (Nov.
11, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/10/AR2010111005
500.html.
306. See supra, Part II.B.2.a.
307. Protocol I, supra note 9, art. 49.1.
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cussed above. For example, the use of a nanobot to infiltrate an individ-
ual’s body and collect data and then transmit that data to an adversary
may seem more like espionage than an attack, despite its invasive nature.
Similarly, the spreading of a gene308 that creates an allergic sensitivity to
pollen may have significant effect on a fighting force, but might not be
termed an act of violence.
Perhaps more vexing with respect to the LOAC definition of attack is
its inability to clearly demarcate the temporal limitations on actions. Re-
calling the example at the beginning of this article, when does the attack
occur? Is it when the virus is sent to Samantha? Is it when Samantha in-
gests the virus? Does Samantha attack all of her friends, associates, and
unwitting accomplices by spreading the virus through proximity? Does the
attack occur when the first infected person, whether Samantha or some-
one who has caught the virus from her, enters an area where she is proxi-
mate to the President? What about when the President actually ingests the
virus? Or is it not an attack until the virus actually begins to do its genetic
work on the President? If an analogy to a mine or explosive is appropriate,
the attack would not occur until the virus actual began to take effect in the
President. That would mean that no proportionality analysis was necessary
for such an attack, since there would be no collateral damage from that
specific attack. Such a conclusion does not seem to support the purposes
of the LOAC in protecting non-participants from the effects of armed
conflict.
Similar scenarios can be created with most future weapons that have
latent effects. Computer viruses may sit resident in computer systems until
activated by the attacker or victim (or third party–see below). Swarms of
microrobots may cross a nation’s borders and take up residence at various
critical points, awaiting the activation signal to commence their opera-
tions.309 As advancing technologies are developed that might affect future
308. With respect specifically to genetic weapons, some commentators believe that all
genetic weapons are already prohibited by the provisions of the 1925 Gas Protocol, Gas Pro-
tocol, supra note 275, and the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention which proscribes “micro-
bial or other biological agents, or toxins[,]” Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons
and on their Destruction, supra note 277. For example, Louise Doswald-Beck, in a presenta-
tion on the application of the LOAC to future wars, stated:
Mention must be made of a potential new method of warfare that is already pro-
hibited in law but that could have horrific effects if developed, namely genetic
weapons. The specter of this as well as of new and obviously preliminary develop-
ments in bio-technology has already motivated States to begin negotiations for the
development of verification methods for the Biological Weapons Convention.
Louise Doswald-Beck, supra note 2, at 44. However, this position is not universally accepted.
Additionally, even if states accepted that they were limited in the use of genetic weapons and
honored their obligations, those arms control conventions do not bind non-state actors and
certainly wouldn’t be a deterrent to terrorist organizations.
309. This scenario could also cause some reflection on the adequacy of the jus ad bel-
lum under the U.N. Charter.
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conflict, the LOAC will need to be ready to not only proscribe illegal be-
havior, but also signal in advance what kinds of behavior are prohibited.
b. Distinction and Discrimination
Article 48 of GPI embodies the foundational LOAC principle of dis-
tinction and states that “belligerents may direct their operations
only against military objectives.”310 This rule is complemented by Article
51, paragraph 2 which states that “the civilian population as such, as well
as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack.”311 This rule is
considered to be customary international law and binding on all nations,
whether parties to the Additional Protocols or not.312
Discrimination in the attack, or the prohibition on indiscriminate at-
tacks, is “an implementation of the principle of distinction”313 and is codi-
fied in GPI, Article 51.4.314 As discussed above, these restrictions only
apply to “attacks,” but even if one takes a very broad view of what consti-
tutes an attack, the LOAC still struggles to signal effectively in the case of
future weapons. For example, in the virus scenario from the beginning of
the article, it appears that the lethal aspect of the virus can be and is di-
rected at a specific military objective, and therefore not indiscriminate.
Article 51.4(c) might allow one to argue that the virus was not discrimi-
nate in the attack because it was “of a nature to strike military objectives
[the President in this case] and civilians or civilian objects without distinc-
tion.”315 However, the argument might be made equally convincingly that
the virus did not “strike” civilians; it merely used or inconvenienced
civilians.
A similar analysis can be made with cyber operations. Some have al-
ready made the argument that as a result of the use of Stuxnet by the
United States, “contemporary warfare will change fundamentally” if cyber
warfare is not regulated by international agreement.316 Speaking specifi-
cally about distinction and discrimination, Patrick Lin, Fritz Allhoff, and
Neil Rowe write:
310. Protocol I, supra note 9, art. 48.
311. Id. art. 51.2.
312. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 226, ¶ 78 (July 8); 1 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOM-
ARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 3 (2005), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/re-
sources/documents/publication/pcustom.htm.
313. 1 HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 312, at 43.
314. Protocol I, supra note 9, art. 51.4.(“Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. Indis-
criminate attacks are: (a) those which are not directed at a specific military objective; (b)
those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed at a specific
military objective; or (c) those which employ a method or means of combat the effects of
which cannot be limited as required by this Protocol; and consequently, in each such case, are
of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction.”).
315. Id. art. 51.4.
316. Misha Glenny, A Weapon We Can’t Control, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2012), http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/06/25/opinion/stuxnet-will-come-back-to-haunt-us.html?_r=0.
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It is unclear how discriminatory cyberwarfare can be. If victims
use fixed Internet addresses for their key infrastructure systems,
and these could be found by an adversary, then they could be
targeted precisely. However, victims are unlikely to be so cooper-
ative. Therefore, effective cyberattacks need to search for targets
and spread the attack, but as with biological viruses, this creates
the risk of spreading to noncombatants: while noncombatants
might not be targeted, there are also no safeguards to help avoid
them. The Stuxnet worm in 2010 was intended to target Iranian
nuclear processing facilities, but it spread far beyond intended
targets. Although its damage was highly constrained, its quick,
broad infection through vulnerabilities in the Microsoft Windows
operating system was noticed and required upgrades to antivirus
software worldwide, incurring a cost to nearly everyone. The
worm also inspired clever ideas for new exploits currently being
used, another cost to everyone.317
The apparent difficulties in applying the principles of distinction and
discrimination318 to potential uses of future weapons implies that an
evolved LOAC would provide better protections to victims of armed
conflicts.
c. Precautions and Re-engineering
Article 57 of the GPI is titled “Precautions in Attack”319 and requires
the commander or fighter to “do everything feasible to verify that the
objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects”320 and
“take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack
with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of
civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.”321
During the ratification process for the Protocol, there was great de-
bate about what the term “feasible” meant.322 Ultimately, “feasible” was
generally understood “to mean that which is practicable or practicably
317. Lin et al., supra note 238.
318. See TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 42, at 157; Jensen, supra note 193, at 213–14.
319. Protocol I, supra note 9, arts. 57.2(a)(i)–(ii), 58.
320. Id. art. 57.2(a)(i).
321. Id. art. 57.2(a)(ii).
322. 14 Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and De-
velopment of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva
(1974-1977), at 199 (1978); Jensen, supra note 193, at 209.
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possible, taking into account the circumstances ruling at the time.”323 This
is the accepted standard when considering an attack.324
One of the interesting aspects of many future weapons systems that is
different than historical weapon systems is the ability to re-engineer these
weapons. Historically, when an attacker dropped a bomb on his adversary,
he did not have to think of potential uses his adversary might make of that
bomb. It was destroyed amidst the heat, blast, and fragmentation of the
explosion. The same is not true of many future weapons. For example,
when an attacker uses a virus or computer malware, the enemy can see
those weapons, recover them, analyze their composition, and then re-cre-
ate or re-engineer them and reuse that weapon. This would be equivalent
to the United States, after using its new stealth aircraft in the fight against
Saddam Hussein in Iraq, simply landing one of the aircraft at an Iraqi
airport and inviting Saddam to give the aircraft to his scientists for analy-
sis. Viruses, computer malware, genetic material, and many other future
weapon systems do not self-destroy on impact. Re-engineering has already
occurred in the case of computer malware325 and will undoubtedly con-
tinue to do so with other modern and future weapon systems.
This raises the question of whether these new technologies lead to a
requirement for commanders to consider the potential effects from re-en-
gineering as part of their attack analysis. In other words, assume a com-
mander has the following plan. He will release a swarm of microrobots,
perhaps in the form of flies, that injects the general population with a
deadly but limited toxin that will only become lethal when combined with
a known vaccination usually given only to military. He knows that his
toxin is very discriminate in the attack, but he also knows that some enter-
prising geneticist might come along and reengineer his virus to affect the
population more generally, having lethal effect on millions instead of one.
If his discreetly targeted toxin has the ability to be re-engineered and used
to kill thousands or millions, must he consider that as part of his analysis
when deploying the toxin?
d. Marking
The LOAC requirement of marking and its relation to future armed
conflict has been addressed earlier in relation to actors on the battle-
323. Letter from Christopher Hulse, Ambassador from the U.K. to Switz., to the Swiss
Gov’t (Jan. 28, 1998), available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/NORM/0A9E03F0F2EE757CC1
256402003FB6D2?OpenDocument (listing the United Kingdom’s reservations and declara-
tions to Additional Protocol I, and explaining in paragraph (b) that “[t]he United Kingdom
understands the term ‘feasible’ as used in the Protocol to mean that which is practicable or
practically possible, taking into account all circumstances ruling at the time, including hu-
manitarian and military considerations”); see also JOINT DOCTRINE & CONCEPTS CENT., THE
JOINT SERVICE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 81 n. 191 (2004) (suggesting the
same interpretation for the word “feasible”).
324. Jensen, supra note 193, at 209–11.
325. Hoffman, supra note 144, at 80; see Ted Samson, Hackers Release Decrypted
Stuxnet Code—But Don’t Panic, INFOWORLD (15 Feb. 2011), http://www.infoworld.com/t/
malware/hackers-release-decrypted-stuxnet-code-dont-panic-685.
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field.326 The fundamental principle is that an attacker is required to distin-
guish himself in the attack.327 Similar concerns exist with relation to
means and methods. Even if the actors are distinguishing themselves, to
what extent is there or should there be a requirement that the weapon be
distinguishable? For example, in the virus scenario, the victim state could
have taken precautions had it been able to distinguish Samantha’s flu-like
symptoms from a potentially deadly virus. As future weapons transform
from “over the horizon” to “from everywhere,” the LOAC will need to
provide some way for the victim to identify the attacker.
One of the more obvious examples of this is brought about by ad-
vances in camouflage, discussed above. As both vehicles and individuals
use advanced technology to look like the surrounding environs, it is likely
that both vehicles and fighters will take on civilian aspects. A tank that is
parked amongst civilian vehicles and takes on their visual attributes may
cross the line between ruse and perfidy. Is a genetically linked virus, mas-
querading as the common flu, significantly different? Similar concerns may
exist in cyber warfare.328
CONCLUSION
The rule of law is the civilian’s best bulwark not only against his own
government but against those who would hold him hostage to their politi-
cal objectives by threatening him with violence.329
When Samantha and the others to whom she has already spread the
virus enter the auditorium where the President will soon be speaking and
carry with them the genetically targeted virus, they will be launching the
LOAC on a course it is not currently prepared to travel. It is likely that
many nations are on the brink of developing similar capabilities and they
will undoubtedly be used in the future.
As Professor Bobbitt states above, the rule of law is vital to protecting
the victims of armed conflict from the effects of armed conflict.330 The
LOAC’s role as a signaling mechanism to states and other developers of
future technologies that will appear on the battlefield is vital to continuing
to limit hostilities with legal proscriptions. Future changes in the places,
actors and means and methods of armed conflict will stress the LOAC’s
ability, as currently understood and applied, to sufficiently regulate that
conflict.
Now is the time to act. In anticipation of these developments, the in-
ternational community needs to recognize the gaps in the current LOAC
and seek solutions in advance of the situation. As the LOAC evolves to
326. See supra, section II.B.1.c.i.
327. Protocol I, supra note 9, art. 44.3.
328. Lin et al., supra note 238.
329. Bobbitt, supra note 138, at 260.
330. See id.
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face anticipated future threats, its signaling function will help ensure that
advancing technologies comply with the foundational principles of the
LOAC and that future armed conflicts remain constrained by law.
